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ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE
Benjamin P. Cooper*

How do people with legal problems find an appropriate lawyer? For
unsophisticated users of legal services—lower- and middle-income
individuals and small businesses—it is a longstanding and vexing
problem. Before hiring a lawyer, consumers want to know the
answers to a variety of questions. Has the lawyer ever been
disciplined? Has the lawyer ever been sued for malpractice? Does
the lawyer carry malpractice insurance? Does the lawyer have the
appropriate experience and expertise to handle this matter? In this
information age, a “Google” search should yield answers to these
questions, but, surprisingly, this critical information is difficult and
sometimes impossible for consumers to find. Moreover, lawyers have
no legal obligation to provide this information to prospective clients.
As a result, many consumers settle for a lawyer who does not fit their
needs or choose not to hire a lawyer at all.
This Article proposes a novel approach to solving this problem. It
argues that the professional duty of communication that is applicable
to the lawyer–client relationship should be extended to the lawyer–
prospective client relationship. Thus, the lawyer should owe the
prospective client a duty to provide sufficient information about
himself—what I call “lawyer-specific information”—so that the
consumer can make an informed decision about whether to hire the
lawyer. At a minimum, this disclosure should answer the questions
posed above.
Part I of this Article describes the lack of lawyer-specific information
available to consumers. Part II explores the current legal obligations
of lawyers to prospective clients. Although lawyers owe prospective
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clients a variety of quasi-fiduciary duties, they have no obligation to
provide lawyer-specific information.
Part III sets forth the
theoretical, moral, and public policy justifications for requiring
lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information: (1) closing the
information gap; (2) consumer protection; (3) the moral and
philosophical concept of informed consent; (4) fulfilling prospective
clients’ expectations; and (5) improving public confidence in the legal
profession. Part IV compares a doctor’s obligation to disclose
physician-specific information to consumers with the lawyer’s
obligation. Although it is easier for consumers to find out information
about prospective doctors than prospective lawyers, some courts have
nevertheless held doctors liable for failing to disclose such
information. This comparison to doctors makes the case for attorney
self-disclosure even stronger.
Part V sets forth a proposed
amendment to the rules of professional conduct that would require
lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information to prospective clients.

Introduction.......................................................................................... 699
I. The Information Gap ........................................................................ 705
A. The Limited Availability of Information About Lawyers’
Experience............................................................................ 706
1. The Limits of Traditional Methods ........................... 706
2. The Limits of Online Searches.................................. 707
B. The Limited Availability of Lawyers’ Disciplinary
History.................................................................................. 709
C. The Limits of Other Publicly Available Information............ 711
1. Malpractice Payments ............................................... 711
2. Malpractice Insurance ............................................... 712
II. The Lawyer–Prospective Client Relationship Under Current Law. 713
A. Lawyers’ Duties to Prospective Clients Under the Rules
of Professional Conduct ....................................................... 713
B. Why Lawyer Silence is “Golden” Under the Law of Fraud . 716
1. Affirmative Misstatements/Outright Lies ................. 717
2. Potentially Misleading Statements ............................ 717
3. Silence ....................................................................... 719
III. The Case for Imposing an Affirmative Disclosure Obligation on
Lawyers ..................................................................................... 721
A. Closing the Information Gap ................................................ 721
B. Consumer Protection............................................................. 722
C. Informed Consent.................................................................. 724
D. The Prospective Client’s Expectations ................................. 726
E. Public Confidence ................................................................. 726

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/9

2

Cooper: ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE
COOPER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED)

2010]

3/18/2011 1:12:40 PM

ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE

699

IV. Comparing Doctors and Lawyers .................................................. 728
A. The Wide Availability of Physician-Specific Information ... 728
B. Doctors’ Duty to Disclose Physician-Specific Information.. 728
1. Physical or Mental Impairments ............................... 730
2. Conflicts of Interest................................................... 731
3. Lack of Experience ................................................... 734
C. What Lawyers Can Learn from the Experience of Doctors.. 736
V. Proposal for Disclosing Lawyer-Specific Information ................... 738
A. An Amendment to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ................................................................................ 738
B. Categories of Mandatory Disclosure..................................... 740
1. Biographical, Licensing and Certification
Information ............................................................. 740
2. Relevant Experience and Expertise........................... 740
3. Disciplinary History .................................................. 742
4. Information Regarding Malpractice Insurance ......... 743
5. Malpractice Payments ............................................... 743
C. Anticipating the Critics ......................................................... 743
Conclusion ........................................................................................... 746
INTRODUCTION
How do people with legal problems find a lawyer? Most do so
through word-of-mouth. 1 For sophisticated users of legal services, such
as large companies and wealthy individuals, a few phone calls to their
“wide network of contacts” generally yield good results. 2 Moreover,
once they have some leads, these sophisticated legal consumers know
where to look to find additional information—for example on Westlaw
or Lexis—about what kind of cases their prospective lawyers have
handled and what results they have achieved. 3 Their experience and
1. Michael S. Harris et al., Local and Specialized Outside Counsel, in 1 SUCCESSFUL
PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 20:12 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2010) (“The most
obvious, the most traditional, and (frequently) the most productive source of attorney referrals is wordof-mouth.”); Steven K. Berenson, Is It Time For Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 645, 648
(2001) (citing a Martindale-Hubbell survey).
2. Harris et al., supra note 1, § 20:12 (noting that sophisticated corporate counsel generally can
contact: “(1) other attorneys within the company itself; (2) existing outside counsel for the company
who has a vested interest in satisfying the company in hope of obtaining repeat business; and (3)
personal friends who presumably do not want you to lose your job”).
3. Id. See also Fred C. Zacharias, The Preemployment Ethical Role of Lawyers: Are Lawyers
Really Fiduciaries?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 581 (2007) (“[S]ophisticated clients are capable of
determining each lawyer’s education and experience, requesting references . . . and comparing the fees
of multiple lawyers they consult.”); Benjamin Barton, Why do We Regulate Lawyers? An Economic
Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 439–40 (2001).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 9
COOPER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED)

700

3/18/2011 1:12:40 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

background also give them the ability to understand the data that they
uncover.
But for the rest of Americans without good contacts in the legal
community—infrequent users of legal services such as small business
owners and lower- and middle-income individuals—the problem of
finding a good lawyer is a longstanding and vexing one. 4 Some look in
the phone book or rely on attorney advertising, 5 which are “haphazard,
shot-in-the-dark methods” for picking a lawyer. 6 Others rely on
“Google” searches, but these tend to yield relatively little information. 7
Not surprisingly, consumers report that they seek highly skilled
lawyers who have integrity. 8 What kind of information would help
consumers choose a lawyer possessing those qualities? Certainly,
consumers want to know whether their prospective lawyers have ever
been disciplined 9 or sued for malpractice; 10 yet, a lawyer has no legal
obligation to disclose this information to prospective clients, 11 and, in
many states, this information is difficult for the public to access or is not
available at all. 12 Consumers also want to know if the lawyer carries
malpractice insurance 13 so that they will be able to recover if their
4. Berenson, supra note 1, at 648 (“The problem of how middle-income persons go about
finding an appropriate lawyer for their legal needs has been much discussed. The consensus seems to be
that there is no clear or easy way for a person to find an appropriate lawyer for his or her particular legal
needs.”). See also Judith L. Maute, Pre-Paid and Group Legal Services: Thirty Years After The Storm,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 916 (2001) (“For over thirty years, the organized bar has studied, squabbled
and lamented over how to address the unmet legal needs of the middle class.”); Linda Morton, Finding a
Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can’t Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession
Should Do About It, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1992).
5. Morton, supra note 4, at 284; CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERV. & THE PUB., AM. BAR ASS’N,
MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994).
6. Maute, supra note 4, at 936 (“As one reporter noted, ‘[L]eafing through the Yellow Pages
and muttering “eeny meeny miney mo”’ is a haphazard and unreliable method of selecting a lawyer.”
(quoting David Segal, Legal HMOs: Defense Against High Fees; Consumers Embracing Prepaid Plans,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1988, at D1)).
7. See infra Part I.A.2.
8. Morton, supra note 4, at 287.
9. Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and “Disclosure Advertising”:
Towards A New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351, 376–77 (1994); Morton, supra note 4, at 288.
10. Berenson, supra note 1, at 684.
11. See infra Part I.B. In at least one state, a lawyer who is suspended must disclose this to
current clients, though not to prospective clients. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 375 n.121 (citation
omitted) (“The impetus for this amendment seems to come from lawyer abuses in which suspended
attorneys would notify their clients in a manner suggesting that the attorney was merely going on a
vacation or leave of absence rather than being disciplined for a breach of professional responsibility
standards.”).
12. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1
(2007); DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 379 (“Disciplinary information is largely not available in a
form useful to the client–consumer.”).
13. Berenson, supra note 1, at 684–85.
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lawyer commits malpractice, but in most states the lawyer has no duty to
disclose this information. 14 Finally, consumers want to know the
lawyer’s specific relevant expertise and experience in order to determine
whether he is a good choice to handle their particular case, 15 but again,
this information is difficult to uncover, and the lawyer has no duty to
disclose it. 16
Thus, consumers—and unsophisticated users of legal services in
particular—are generally unable to find out critical information about
prospective lawyers even if they appreciate the need to seek out this
information. 17 As a result, some are forced to settle for a lawyer who
does not fit their needs, 18 while others choose not to obtain a lawyer’s
assistance at all. 19 Ultimately, the inability of these individuals to find a

14. See SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD 18–22
(2d ed. 2008). Only seven states require disclosure of malpractice insurance information to clients,
while eighteen others require disclosure on their bar registration statements. See STANDING COMM. ON
CLIENT PROTECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE ON
INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
professional_responsibility/malprac_disc_chart.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited March 4, 2011).
15. Tracy Walters McCormack & Christopher John Bodnar, Honesty Is the Best Policy: It’s Time
to Disclose Lack of Jury Trial Experience, 23 GEO. J. LEG. ETH. 155, 158 (2010) (“Our survey data
further indicates that potential clients find a litigator’s jury trial experience to be a material factor in a
hiring decision, and, perhaps not surprisingly, they prefer to hire litigators with jury trial experience.”).
16. Id. at 171 (“Right now, lawyers are not required to disclose their lack of trial experience and
there is no legal ramification for the failure to do so.”); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 569.
17. To make matters worse, even when they obtain information, unsophisticated consumers
“might find it more difficult [than experienced legal consumers] to compare the competence and
experience of competing lawyers.” Id. at 581–82 (“[I]t may be beyond the capacity of unsophisticated
or inexperienced potential clients to investigate even relatively concrete factors because they may not
realize they should, may be too dependent to shop around or probe, or may not know the questions to
ask.”); Barton, supra note 3, at 440 (arguing that many clients now have better ability to find
information out about their lawyers but acknowledging that “there may be pockets of the legal market
where information asymmetry remains a problem”); Berenson, supra note 1, at 649 (“The recipients of
professional services lack the specialized knowledge necessary to evaluate the quality of services they
receive.”). Still, more information is better than less, particularly when that information is accompanied
by an explanation from the lawyer of the relevance of, for example, that lawyer’s particular experience
and expertise.
18. Professor Berenson cited an unpublished 2000 survey conducted by Martindale-Hubbell that
concluded that:
“[m]ore than one-fourth of Americans admit that the inability to compare information
about different attorneys (28%) and being intimidated or confused by the whole process
(27%) of choosing a lawyer would limit their ability to research their options.” Another
fifth (20%) claim their ability to research options for choosing a lawyer is limited by lack
of resources and information.
Berenson, supra note 1, at 648.
19. Maute, supra note 4, at 936 (“Even when middle-class consumers recognize that they might
benefit from a lawyer’s services, they are reluctant to seek out legal assistance because they are
concerned about the cost of legal services and they lack the requisite knowledge to find a competent
lawyer.”).
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good lawyer limits their ability to access the legal system. 20
Further exacerbating the problem is the explosion of attorney
advertising following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 21 which held that truthful advertising by attorneys is
constitutionally protected speech, 22 and advertising now takes many
forms—both traditional (e.g., billboards, television, radio, and
newsletters) and non-traditional (e.g., websites and blogs). 23 In their
advertising, lawyers have the opportunity to present their best
qualities. 24 Moreover, once the consumer is in the lawyer’s office,
speaking to the lawyer on the telephone, or sizing up the lawyer at a
“beauty contest,” the lawyer has additional opportunities to sell his
positive attributes. The lawyer can discuss his recent successes, his
firm’s excellent personal service, or the quality of his associates. Thus,
while consumers have difficulty finding neutral or negative information
about prospective lawyers, they are also bombarded with information
from lawyers about their positive qualities. 25 In other words, legal
consumers have more than sufficient opportunity to hear why they
should hire particular lawyers, but they do not get the chance to find out
why they should not. 26
Commentators have made various suggestions for addressing this
problem in whole or in part. Professor Leslie Levin recently
documented the shameful secrecy surrounding the lawyer disciplinary
system and made a persuasive case for “less secrecy in lawyer
discipline.” 27 Addressing this same issue in an earlier article, Professors
Sandra DeGraw and Bruce Burton proposed mandatory “disclosure
20. See generally Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 418 (2004)
(One “strategy for improving the market and enhancing the attractiveness of legal services involves
increasing the information readily available about their quality.”).
21. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
22. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 379–80; Berenson, supra note 1, at 653.
23. For example, New York defines attorney advertising very broadly as “any public or private
communication made by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm about that lawyer or law firm’s services,
the primary purpose of which is for the retention of the lawyer or law firm.” N.Y. RULE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.0(a) (2009). Under this definition, a lawyer’s website, blog, or newsletter—which are
most likely written for the purpose of attracting clients—arguably qualify as advertising and are
therefore subject to New York’s rules on advertising. Regardless of whether they are subject to
advertising regulations, firm websites, blogs, and newsletters are an increasingly common way for
lawyers to promote themselves.
24. Harris et al., supra note 1, § 20:12 (“[N]o lawyer has ever understated his or her credential on
a firm web site.”).
25. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 383 (“In selecting a lawyer, the only data concerning
quality that is functionally available to most prospective client–consumers comes from the self-serving
advertising of lawyer–vendors and from the general practice of lawyer licensing by the courts.”).
26. Id. at 379.
27. See Levin, supra note 12.
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advertising,” a system in which lawyers would be required to disclose
disciplinary actions taken against them to clients, prospective clients,
and the public. 28
Similarly, Professor Tracy McCormack and
Christopher Bodnar recently argued that litigators be required to disclose
their jury trial experience (or lack thereof) to potential clients. 29 While
these commentators focused narrowly on one issue, Professor Steve
Berenson targeted the more general unavailability of information about
lawyers by suggesting that legislatures consider requiring lawyers to
create and make public “lawyer profiles” containing a variety of
information, including “demographic information,” “licensing and
certification information,” “malpractice payments” made by the lawyer,
“information regarding malpractice insurance,” “disciplinary
information,” and “criminal convictions.” 30
While these arguments all have merit, this Article proposes a different
approach. It argues that the professional duty of communication that is
applicable during the lawyer–client relationship 31 should also apply to
the relationship between the lawyer and a prospective client. Thus, just
as the lawyer must provide the client with sufficient information during
the representation “to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation,” 32 the lawyer should be required to
communicate to the prospective client sufficient information about
himself—what I call “lawyer-specific information”—so that the
prospective client can make an informed decision about whether to hire
the lawyer. At a minimum, this disclosure should include five
categories of information: (1) biographical, licensing, and certification
information; (2) disciplinary history; (3) information about the lawyer’s
malpractice insurance; (4) malpractice payments; and (5) the lawyer’s
specific experience and expertise relevant to the prospective client’s
matter along with an explanation of the relationship between the
lawyer’s prior experience and the work that will be necessary in the
proposed new matter.
This disclosure obligation addresses issues beyond just disciplinary
history, which was the focus for Professors Levin, DeGraw, and Burton,
28. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 351. See also Sara Murray, Comment, The Whole Truth
and Nothing But the Truth? Should Attorneys Who Advertise Be Required to Disclose Prior
Disciplinary Actions Taken Against Them?, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 953 (1990).
29. McCormack & Bodnar, supra note 15.
30. Berenson, supra note 1, at 683–87. While Professor Berenson promoted the benefits of
lawyer profiles, he concluded that “the underlying conditions that paved the way for physician profiles
do not appear to be present to the same degree in the legal context [and therefore] it seems unlikely that
publicly accessible lawyer profiles will become a reality in the near future.” Id. at 683.
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006).
32. Id. R. 1.4(b).
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and trial experience, which was the focus for Professors McCormack
and Bodnar. It is also differs from Professor Berenson’s suggested
“lawyer profiles” in several respects. First, the consumer will not have
to look anywhere to find the information; instead, the lawyer will have
to give the information to the consumer directly so that there will be no
question whether the consumer actually received it. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, this Article proposes greater disclosure than
Professor Berenson’s “lawyer profiles.” Specifically, the lawyer should
be required to disclose to the consumer the lawyer’s specific experience
and expertise relevant to the consumer’s case and provide an explanation
of the relationship between the lawyer’s prior experience and the work
that will be necessary in the proposed new matter. This information is
critical to the consumer’s ability to make an informed choice about what
lawyer to hire, and the lawyer himself is the only person in a position to
provide it. 33
Part I canvasses the information available—or not available—to
prospective clients about how to find a lawyer. This Part also
demonstrates that, even if consumers know what information to look for,
it is generally unavailable to them. Part II explores how the law
currently treats the attorney–prospective client relationship and explains
that lawyers already owe prospective clients a variety of quasi-fiduciary
duties, though the duty to communicate lawyer-specific information is
not among them. Imposing on lawyers the duty to disclose lawyerspecific information would be consistent with the nature of the existing
quasi-fiduciary relationship between lawyer and prospective client. Part
III sets forth the theoretical, moral, and public policy justifications for
requiring lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information to prospective
clients, specifically: (1) closing the information gap; (2) consumer
protection; (3) the moral and philosophical notion of informed consent;
(4) fulfilling prospective clients’ expectations; and (5) improving public

33. The idea that a lawyer should have a duty to communicate with prospective clients has
received surprisingly little attention. The late Fred Zacharias recently became the first to specifically
address this issue. See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 569. This Article builds on that important work on
this issue in several respects. First, it provides a variety of theoretical and public policy justifications
that Professor Zacharias did not discuss for imposing this new duty on lawyers. Second, it answers a
question that Professor Zacharias explicitly left open: what should be the precise scope of the lawyer’s
duty to communicate with prospective clients? See id. at 575 (“This Article argues that the professional
regulatory scheme should clarify and facilitate enforcement of lawyers’ pre-employment obligations.
Resolving all questions pertaining to a lawyer’s ethical role at the retainer stage, however, is not the
Article’s purpose. The issues are complex. Any resolution will have significant effects on legal practice
and the common law, and as a consequence, is likely to prove controversial. The Article’s primary goal
is simply to make sure the subject receives the attention it deserves.”); id. at 641 (“This Article does not
resolve the issue of what lawyers’ ethical and legal obligations to potential clients are. Nor does it offer
a firm vision of how lawyers’ responsibilities, if any, should be implemented or enforced.”).
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confidence in the legal profession. Part IV compares lawyers with
doctors and describes how much easier it is for consumers to find a
doctor. Despite this, some courts have held doctors liable for failing to
disclose physician-specific information. This comparison bolsters the
argument for lawyer disclosure of lawyer-specific information. Part V
specifically sets forth this Article’s proposal for implementing the
lawyer’s duty to disclose lawyer-specific information and addresses
some potential criticisms of this proposal.
I. THE INFORMATION GAP
A young married couple wants to draft their wills; an individual
suffers unforeseen complications from a botched surgery; a small
business owner is being investigated by the Internal Revenue Service.
These individuals are looking for an honest, high quality lawyer with the
appropriate expertise to handle their case, but they typically are also
inexperienced with the legal system and lack the personal contacts that
can refer them to a suitable lawyer. How can they find the names of
appropriate lawyers and information about those lawyers? A variety of
bar associations, state courts, and consumer protection groups have
produced guides to advise consumers on how to find a lawyer. These
guides generally share the view that word-of-mouth referrals, attorney
referral services, advertisements, phone books, and legal directories,
such as Martindale-Hubbell, are the best way to find a lawyer. 34
Unfortunately, following this advice yields surprisingly little relevant
information. 35 First, as set forth in subpart A, it is difficult for
consumers to learn information about their prospective lawyers’
experience and expertise using these sources. Second, as set forth in
subpart B, even a lawyer’s disciplinary history is surprisingly difficult to
uncover. Third, subpart C describes the limited availability of other
critical lawyer-specific information, particularly the lawyer’s history of
malpractice claims and information about the lawyer’s malpractice
insurance.

34. See, e.g., DC Bar Pamphlet, How to Find and Work With a Lawyer,
www.dcbar.org/for_the_public/working_with_lawyers/find.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2010); THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, A CONSUMER’S PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MANAGING A RELATIONSHIP WITH A
LAWYER 4–5 (2009); Don Griesmann: How to Find a Lawyer for Your Nonprofit Organization, Feb. 5,
2009, www.stepbystepfundraising.com/how-to-find-a-lawyer-nonprofit/; Nolo, How to Find an
Excellent Lawyer, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/article-29868.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2010); Better Bus. Bureau of N.Y., How to Find a Lawyer in NYC, http://newyork.bbb.org/how-to-finda-lawyer-in-nyc/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
35. Of course, another problem with this advice is that some will not even read it.
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A. The Limited Availability of Information About Lawyers’ Experience
Once a consumer decides to hire a lawyer, he wants to find a suitable
one. Generally, “a lawyer’s suitability depends upon three factors: his
general ability (including his native ability and legal skills), his general
experience, and his specific experience handling this type of case.” 36
Unfortunately, consumers are unable to find this information on their
own using traditional means or the Internet.
1. The Limits of Traditional Methods
Personal referrals, whether through friends, relatives, insurance
companies, charitable organizations, or other professionals, 37 are
uniformly considered the best resource for finding a lawyer. 38 But
trying to find a lawyer by word of mouth is only effective if consumers
know people who know good lawyers. Many individuals simply do not
have the kind of connections that are going to help them find a good
lawyer. 39 Thus, unsophisticated users of legal services must use other
approaches.
But other suggested methods for finding a suitable lawyer have their
own problems. Consumers relying on the phone book or attorney
advertising are unlikely to find an appropriate attorney. Stating the
obvious, one commentator has noted that these are “haphazard, shot-inthe-dark methods” for picking a lawyer. 40
Public interest organizations, the Bar, and some commentators tout
attorney referral services as a promising method to help lower- and
middle-income consumers find lawyers, 41 but in their current
incarnation they remain problematic. Typically, these referral services,
often run on a not-for-profit basis by local bar associations, send
consumers who contact them to the “next lawyer in line who has
expressed a willingness to take cases in the problem area identified by
the client.” 42 This approach suffers from several critical flaws. First,
the referral services “rarely require the attorney to demonstrate any
particular expertise or experience in a problem area in order to receive
36. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 579.
37. D.C. Bar Pamphlet, supra note 34.
38. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
40. Maute, supra note 4, at 936; supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also Berenson, supra
note 1, at 653 (“Of course, beyond areas of practice there is little substantive information in the yellow
pages that would assist a person in selecting an appropriate attorney.”).
41. Morton, supra note 4.
42. Berenson, supra note 1, at 654.
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referrals in that area.” 43 Second, “no effort is made to match particular
attorney competencies or characteristics to those of the potential client
or case.” 44 Third, the customer receives very little information about the
referred lawyer. 45
2. The Limits of Online Searches
In the age of Google, one would think that the Internet would be a
good resource for consumers to find information about prospective
lawyers, but the information available online is limited. 46 For example,
if a customer types a particular lawyer’s name into Martindale-Hubbell’s
website, 47 the customer learns where the lawyer went to college and law
school 48 and the lawyer’s bar admissions and practice areas (as
designated by the lawyer), but this is no better than what was available
in the hard copy version of Martindale-Hubbell and is hardly the kind of
lawyer-specific information that a consumer needs to choose a good
lawyer for a particular case.
Martindale-Hubbell has a rating system based on peer review, 49 but
the only ratings are “A,” “B,” and “C,” which tells a consumer very little
about the relative merits of using the prospective lawyer for the
consumer’s particular case. Moreover, many lawyers are not rated at all.
Indeed, if a lawyer does not receive the rating that he wants, he can
request that Martindale-Hubbell not rate him, 50 and Martindale-Hubbell
explicitly states that the lack of a rating should not be held against a
lawyer. 51 This policy clearly undermines the legitimacy of Martindale43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 654–55.
46. A full discussion of all of the websites that list and rate lawyers is beyond the scope of this
Article. This Article focuses on two of the most popular websites—www.martindale.com and
www.avvo.com.
Other
ratings
websites—for
example,
www.lawyerlistings.com,
www.lawyerratinz.com, and www.lawyerreviewsonline.com—suffer from shortcomings similar to those
discussed in connection with martindale.com and avvo.com.
47. Martindale-Hubbell, www.martindalehubbell.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). Of course, for
many years, consumers could use Martindale-Hubbell and other directories in book form, but these
traditional resources have been largely supplanted by online resources.
48. This information is not always, accurate, however. Spot-checking the accuracy of the
available information revealed that the listing for one of the most prominent lawyers in Philadelphia
listed the incorrect law school.
49. See Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings, http://www.martindale.com/xp/legal/
About_Martindale/Products_and_Services/Peer_Review_Ratings/ratings.xml (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
50. Martindale-Hubbell, Frequently Asked Questions About LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell
Peer Review Ratings, http://law.lexisnexis.com/literature/LMH00074-0.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2010)
(“Some lawyers request not to have any rating published.”).
51. Id.
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Hubbell’s entire rating system.
A relatively new website, Avvo.com, appears to hold the potential to
provide consumers with helpful information, but what the site currently
provides is inadequate. Avvo collects information about lawyers and
then attempts to put a rating on the lawyer. According to the website,
Avvo collects publicly available information and, “using a mathematical
model that considers the information shown in a lawyer’s profile,
including a lawyer’s years in practice, disciplinary history, professional
achievements and industry recognition—all factors that, in our opinion,
are relevant to assessing a lawyer’s qualifications,” gives the lawyer a
rating on a scale of one to ten. 52
Despite its stated goal, Avvo.com remains a work in progress and
currently suffers from a number of inadequacies. First, while it collects
publicly available information on lawyers, it also relies on the website’s
users—both the lawyers themselves and third-parties—to input
additional information about the lawyers, and if the lawyer’s profile
contains only publicly available information, as is the case for many
lawyers on the site, then there is no numerical rating for the lawyer. For
these lawyers, the only rating that Avvo provides is “No Concerns” if
the individual has no publicly available disciplinary history or
“Attention” if the attorney has a disciplinary history. 53 As a result, as
one commentator has stated, Avvo is less helpful in evaluating lawyers
than Netflix.com is in evaluating movies because Avvo “lack[s] the
large data sets that help keep Netflix ratings accurate.” 54
Second, even if the lawyer has a numerical rating, it is unclear what
that rating means. As an initial matter, it is hard to tell the specific basis
for the numerical rating beyond the general information that Avvo
discloses about its rating system: the rating system “considers the
information shown in a lawyer’s profile, including a lawyer’s years in
practice, disciplinary history, professional achievements and industry

52. See Avvo, http://www.avvo.com/support/avvo_rating (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
53. Initially, Avvo.com gave all lawyers numerical ratings, but in response to concerns about the
reliability of those ratings and that potential clients would focus too heavily on the numbers, Avvo
changed its system so that lawyers who have not claimed their profiles and lawyers for whom Avvo has
insufficient information do not have numerical ratings. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Riding Circuits:
Three From The Web, CBA REC., Sept. 2007. One lawyer in Seattle actually filed suit against Avvo
alleging that the ratings were “arbitrary and capricious” and that they therefore violated the Washington
Consumer Protection Act. See Complaint, Browne v. Avvo, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (No.CV7-920 RSL), available at http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/venture/library/
Avvo_Complaint_FINAL_secured1.pdf. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Browne,
525 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
54. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1710 (2008).
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recognition.” 55 When I searched for myself on Avvo, I initially had a
“No Concerns” rating without a numerical rating because I have no
history of bar discipline. I then “claimed my profile” and was
immediately given a rating of 6.2 on the 10-point scale. After plugging
in some very basic biographical information, specifically where I went
to college and law school and my work experience, my rating rose to
7.5. 56 Other attorneys have reported receiving an increased rating based
on a softball award. 57 Thus, consumers need to take these numerical
ratings with a grain of salt. 58
Finally, even if a lawyer’s numerical rating means something, how
does this rating really help the consumer find an appropriate lawyer for
his particular case? Just because a lawyer is highly rated does not mean
that the lawyer will be a good fit for the particular case.
In short, while consumers can get some information from Avvo.com
and Martindale.com—and Avvo seems to hold significant promise 59 —at
this point in time, consumers cannot find the kind of critical lawyerspecific information through these websites that they need in order to
make an informed decision about whether to hire a particular lawyer. 60
B. The Limited Availability of Lawyers’ Disciplinary History
Although consumers want to know whether their prospective lawyer
has ever been disciplined, 61 this information is surprisingly difficult for
consumers to find. In the digital age, this information should be readily
available for visitors to Avvo and the public in general to see. As set
forth supra, however, although Avvo attempts to collect and report on
lawyers’ disciplinary history, 62 Avvo’s information is incomplete in a
number of respects. The shortcoming in Avvo’s information has
nothing to do with Avvo as it collects and reports on everything that is
55. Avvo, Avvo Rating Overview, http://www.avvo.com/support/avvo_rating (last visited Sept.
5, 2010).
56. Others have described similar experiences with Avvo. See Friedman, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. Relatedly, I saw my rating increase without any apparent verification on Avvo’s part of the
information that I submitted, and others have reported the same experience. Id.
59. The fact that Deborah Rhode, one of the top legal ethics scholars in the world, is on Avvo’s
Legal Advisory Board, see Team: Management, http://www.avvo.com/about_avvo/boards_and_bios
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010), lends the website significant credibility, but for now, the website remains a
work in progress.
60. See also Zacharias, supra note 3, at 581 (“Few, if any, external tools exist to assist clients in
investigating lawyers. No consumer reports on the subject exist, precisely because the assessment is
imprecise and varies with the nature of each case.”).
61. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 376–77; Morton, supra note 4, at 288.
62. See supra Part I.A.2.
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publicly available, but rather is the fault of the shamefully secret lawyer
disciplinary process, which Professor Leslie Levin recently discussed in
detail. 63
As Avvo points out, there are several situations where a lawyer might
have a disciplinary sanction that will not show up on Avvo. 64 The first
case is where the lawyer has received “private” sanctions. 65 According
to Professor Levin, almost all jurisdictions impose private discipline as
one form of punishment, and “in many jurisdictions, it is the type of
discipline most often imposed.” 66 Typically, when an attorney receives
private discipline, only the disciplined lawyer and the complaining party
learn about the discipline, while the “punishment” is kept confidential
from the public, including Avvo users. 67 Indeed, by rule in some
jurisdictions, the complaining party cannot even publicize the private
discipline. 68
A second significant problem is that the disciplinary data that some
states make available, either to Avvo 69 or to anybody who inquires, 70 is
incomplete. For example, in some states the available history only goes
back to the mid-1990s. 71 Moreover, in some cases, even “public”
discipline will become unavailable to the public after a specified period
of time. 72 Finally, sometimes state bar websites do not reveal the basis
for the attorney’s discipline. 73
Professor Levin further notes that even in this digital age, many
jurisdictions do not make “public” disciplinary information available
online. 74 Instead, in some states, the bar makes disciplinary information
available only by publishing the information in newspapers or worse, the
disciplinary agencies will only disclose the lawyer’s disciplinary history
63. See generally Levin, supra note 12.
64. See Avvo, supra note 55.
65. Id. (“Bar associations can discipline an attorney in private and that disciplinary sanction does
not appear in the public record. If it is not in the public record, we will not know about it.”).
66. Levin, supra note 12, at 20.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Avvo, supra note 55.
70. Levin, supra note 12, at 21.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 20–21. For example, the Mississippi Bar “does not have a computer database listing
disciplinary action”—even serious disciplinary action such as disbarment or suspension. See Tim
Doherty, Doctor and Lawyer Records Not on Web, HATTIESBURG AM., Mar. 17, 2009. As the General
Counsel of the Mississippi Bar stated, “[t]here is nothing on our web site that would enable a member of
the public to see where a particular attorney has been disciplined.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The only way for the public to find out about disciplinary action taken against attorneys would
be from the Mississippi Supreme Court’s online docket, but even that provides “scant detail.” Id.
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if the consumer picks up the phone and calls the agency. 75
Professor Levin also points out that the disciplinary process itself
lacks transparency in many states. The large majority of states keep
complaints about lawyers private until there is a finding of probable
cause by the disciplinary agency. 76 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the
public is prohibited from attending discipline hearings. 77
There is one final hurdle to a consumer’s attempt to obtain
disciplinary information about his prospective lawyer. Even if a
consumer knows to request disciplinary history from the disciplinary
authority in the consumer’s home state, that request will not turn up
disciplinary history in another state. Consumers can request this
information from the American Bar Association, which maintains a
National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, for a fee of ten dollars, 78 but
many consumers do not know about this service. Further, even this
service is not guaranteed to reveal an attorney’s entire disciplinary
history because, since, as the ABA explains, the reporting of this
information to the ABA is “voluntary” and, therefore, “the Data Bank
makes no claim that its records represent every public regulatory action
taken and reinstatement/readmission issued.” 79
C. The Limits of Other Publicly Available Information
Two other pieces of information that consumers want to know about
their prospective lawyers—whether the lawyer has legal malpractice
insurance and whether the lawyer has any malpractice judgments against
him—are also difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to discover.
1. Malpractice Payments
Just as consumers want to know whether a prospective lawyer has
ever been disciplined because it may make that lawyer more likely to
engage in misconduct in the future, consumers want to know if their
prospective lawyer has ever lost a malpractice case because that might
indicate that the lawyer is more likely to commit malpractice again in
75. Levin, supra note 12, at 20.
76. Id. at 19 (noting that only four states—Florida, New Hampshire, Oregon and West
Virginia—“treat all or most complaints about lawyers as a matter of public record”).
77. Id. at 20 n.124 (noting that Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Nevada,
Utah, Wyoming, Missouri, New York and Texas prohibit the public from attending disciplinary
hearings).
78. ABA Regulation Databank, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/regulation/databank.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2010).
79. Id.
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the future. 80 This information is not readily available, however. If the
lawyer made a payment as part of a settlement, that information is
generally confidential, and the consumer will not have a way to find out
about it. As for malpractice judgments, consumers might be able to find
out about at least some of them through a careful search of court records
and online sources, such as Westlaw or Lexis, but most consumers do
not have the knowledge or skill to discover this information on their
own.
2. Malpractice Insurance
Consumers want to know whether a prospective lawyer has
malpractice insurance for a simple reason: “As in any other commercial
transaction involving personal services, clients prefer attorneys who can
reimburse them for damages resulting from inadequate legal services.” 81
This information generally remains out of the reach of consumers,
however. The ABA, apparently recognizing consumers’ interest in this
information, has adopted a model court rule that would require lawyers
to disclose whether they carry malpractice insurance to the state bar,
though not directly to consumers, 82 and eighteen states follow some
form of this rule. 83 Only seven states require lawyers to disclose this
information directly to consumers. 84 Thus, in half of the states, this
information is not publicly available at all, and in forty-three states,
consumers will not get this information unless they know to request it
from the state bar.

80. Berenson, supra note 1, at 645.
81. John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning from Ohio’s Struggles
to Reform Its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 103 (1999); Berenson, supra note 1, at 684–85
(recommending that information regarding malpractice insurance be included in his proposed lawyer
profiles).
82. See
ABA
Insurance
Disclosure,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/
Model_Rule_InsuranceDisclosure.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (“Each lawyer admitted to the active
practice of law shall certify to the [highest court of the jurisdiction] on or before [December 31 of each
year]: 1) whether the lawyer is engaged in the private practice of law; 2) if engaged in the private
practice of law, whether the lawyer is currently covered by professional liability insurance; 3) whether
the lawyer intends to maintain insurance during the period of time the lawyer is engaged in the private
practice of law; and 4) whether the lawyer is exempt from the provisions of this Rule because the lawyer
is engaged in the practice of law as a full-time government lawyer or is counsel employed by an
organizational client and does not represent clients outside that capacity. Each lawyer admitted to the
active practice of law in this jurisdiction who reports being covered by professional liability insurance
shall notify [the highest court in the jurisdiction] in writing within 30 days if the insurance policy
providing coverage lapses, is no longer in effect or terminates for any reason.”).
83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. See STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, supra note 14.
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II. THE LAWYER–PROSPECTIVE CLIENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER CURRENT
LAW
Having reviewed the difficulties facing consumers in finding out
information about prospective lawyers on their own, the next question is
whether, under current law, those prospective lawyers have any
affirmative duty to disclose that information to consumers. As set forth
in this Part, the answer is no. Although lawyers cannot lie if a
prospective client asks them a direct question, they have no affirmative
obligation to disclose lawyer-specific information.
The duties owed by a lawyer to a prospective client fall into two
categories: those imposed by the rules of professional conduct and those
imposed by all other generally applicable law. 85 As set forth in subpart
A, the rules of professional conduct impose a wide variety of quasifiduciary obligations on lawyers in dealing with prospective clients, but
those obligations do not include the duty to disclose lawyer-specific
information. Moreover, as set forth in subpart B, under the law of fraud,
which applies to lawyers just as it applies to everybody else – a lawyer
cannot make an affirmative misrepresentation to a prospective client, but
he can remain silent about his qualifications. In other words, the lawyer
has no affirmative duty to disclose lawyer-specific information under the
law of fraud, just as he has no duty to disclose that information under the
rules of professional conduct.
A. Lawyers’ Duties to Prospective Clients Under the Rules of
Professional Conduct
When a person “discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a
client–lawyer relationship with respect to a matter,” the rules of
professional conduct define that person as a “prospective client.” 86
Although there is some disagreement as to how to characterize the
lawyer’s relationship with a prospective client—courts and
commentators disagree on whether to characterize it as a fiduciary
relationship or an arms-length relationship 87 —it is clear that the rules of

85. MARTYN & FOX, supra note 14, at 18–20.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(a) (2006). A lawyer–client relationship does not
exist until the prospective client has “manifest[ed] to a lawyer [his] intent that the lawyer provides legal
services . . . and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or (2) the lawyer fails to
manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000).
87. See Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 739 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The fiduciary relationship
between an attorney and his client extends even to preliminary consultations between the client and the
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professional conduct impose certain important “fiduciary-like” duties on
lawyers in their relationship with prospective clients.88 As set forth in
this subpart, these “fiduciary-like” duties impose significant obligations
on the lawyer far beyond those of the typical party to a negotiation.
First, although it would appear that “lawyers are free to bargain with
[prospective] clients at arms length before they enter into a client–
lawyer relationship,” the rules of professional conduct actually impose
significant restraints on lawyers “in the context of contractual fee
negotiations.” 89 Thus, the rules protect prospective clients by requiring
lawyers to be forthcoming during fee negotiations and communicate the
“basis or rate of the fee [and expenses for which the client will be
responsible] preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time
after commencing the representation.” 90
As one commentator
explained, in the context of the negotiating process with prospective
clients, the rules:
require that a lawyer present the client with information regarding the fee
arrangement that approximates what the client would obtain if the client
consulted a second lawyer for assistance in negotiating the fee
arrangement with the primary lawyer. Fairness is to be determined
according to a heightened fiduciary standard rather than the arms-length
marketplace standard. 91

In addition to this obligation to communicate information about their
fees, the rules impose limits on what lawyers can charge clients.
Lawyers may not charge anything they want to; rather, the rules protect

attorney regarding the attorney’s possible retention.”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client
extends to preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer,
although actual employment does not result.”); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 573 n.4–5 (collecting
authorities); see also Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 55 (1989) (arguing that a fiduciary duty “attaches whenever
a potential client approaches a lawyer in a professional capacity—even to seek information about the
lawyer’s fee”). But see Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting
that “in general, the negotiation of a fee agreement is an arm’s-length transaction”) (citation omitted).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. b (2000) (noting
that “prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients”); see also
Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn, Misrepresentation by Lawyers About Credentials or
Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 545 (2004) (“[T]he lawyer does not owe a prospective client the full
range of fiduciary duties that are owed to clients.”).
89. MARTYN & FOX, supra note 14, at 400.
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2006). See also id. R. 1.5(c) (requiring
contingent fee agreements to be in writing). Some states require written retainer agreements in all or
nearly all cases. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6148 (West 2009). Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
1.5(b) also suggests that the “scope of the representation” be in writing.
91. Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics
2000’s Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1182, 1182.
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prospective clients by requiring that all fee arrangements be
reasonable. 92 As one court stated: “[L]awyers, unlike some other
service professionals, cannot charge unreasonable fees even if they are
able to find clients who will pay whatever a lawyer’s contract
demands.” 93
In addition to this general prohibition on unreasonable fees, lawyers
are forbidden from entering into a wide variety of specific fee
arrangements with prospective clients. For example,
 a lawyer may not charge a contingent fee for a domestic relations
matter or a criminal case; 94
 lawyers from different firms may only share fees under limited
circumstances; 95
 a lawyer may not accept literary or media rights to the client’s
case; 96
 a lawyer may not “provide financial assistance,” such as living
expenses, to a client, even an indigent one; 97
 a lawyer may not acquire a proprietary interest in the client’s
cause of action. 98
Thus, the rules provide prospective clients with a broad array of
protections with regard to fee negotiations and arrangements. 99
Second, the professional rules require the lawyer to inform the
prospective client if the lawyer has a conflict of interest and, assuming
that the conflict is consentable, the lawyer must obtain the prospective
client’s consent to the lawyer’s representation despite the conflict. 100 As
part of the process of obtaining consent, the lawyer must inform the
prospective client about the advantages and disadvantages of waiving

92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 (2000) (“A lawyer may not charge a fee larger than is reasonable in the
circumstances or that is prohibited by law.”).
93. In re Sinnott, 845 A.2d 373, 379 (Vt. 2004).
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2006).
95. Id. R. 1.5(e), 7.2(b).
96. Id. R. 1.8(d).
97. Id. R. 1.8(e).
98. Id. R. 1.8(i).
99. See Walton v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 149 S.W.3d 834, 847 (Tex. App. 2004)
(noting that even an informed client cannot ratify a fee agreement that “violates public policy”), vacated,
Walton/Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P. v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P./Walton, No. 08-03-00366CV, 2007 WL 416694 (Tex. App. Feb. 8, 2007). But see King v. Fox, 851 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (N.Y.
2006); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 610, n.137 (collecting authorities).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2006).
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the conflict. 101
Third, lawyers have an obligation to keep the confidences of
prospective clients. 102
This is essentially the same duty of
confidentiality that lawyers owe current and former clients. 103 Thus,
when a lawyer meets with a prospective client to talk about taking on a
case, the lawyer must keep the conversation confidential even though
the lawyer is usually not being paid for the initial consultation.
Fourth, lawyers owe prospective clients a limited duty of loyalty and
must in some circumstances avoid taking on clients whose interests
conflict with those of prospective clients. 104 Even if the lawyer does not
take the prospective client’s case, the information that he has learned can
prevent him from taking on a “client with interests materially adverse to
those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related
matter.” 105
Finally, lawyers owe the same duty of competence to prospective
clients that they owe to clients. 106 If the lawyer provides the prospective
client with any legal advice, the lawyer must use the same level of “legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation” that a lawyer employs
for a client. 107
As this discussion demonstrates, lawyers already owe prospective
clients many of the same duties that they owe to clients. The only
significant duty that they owe to clients but not to prospective clients is
the duty to communicate. 108
B. Why Lawyer Silence is “Golden” Under the Law of Fraud
In addition to the applicable rules of professional conduct, lawyers are
subject to a vast array of statutory and common law, 109 including the law
of fraud. 110 In a 2004 article, Vincent Johnson and Shawn Lovorn
101. Id. R. 7; Zacharias, supra note 3, at 580.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b) (2006).
103. See id. R. 6, 1.9.
104. Id. R. 18(b), (c).
105. Id. R. 18(c).
106. Id. R. 1.18 cmt. 9 (“For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the
merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1.”).
107. See id. R. 1.1. Arguably, the very act of giving legal advice converts the prospective client
into a client. See Togstad v. Vesley, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980).
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006). Rule 7.1 does impose a general
obligation on lawyers not to “make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer’s service,” see id. R. 7.1, but this rule does not impose any affirmative obligation on the lawyer
to communicate lawyer-specific information.
109. See MARTYN & FOX, supra note 14.
110. Id. at 139–44. See also Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal.
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analyzed whether lawyers commit fraud when they make misleading
assertions about their own credentials or fail to disclose unfavorable
information concerning their credentials. 111 Johnson and Lovorn
considered three distinct types of conduct: (1) outright lies; (2)
“potentially misleading statements, such as half-truths and statements of
opinion;” and (3) silence. 112 As set forth in this subpart, they concluded
that, as a general matter, a lawyer cannot lie to his prospective client, but
he has no affirmative duty to disclose lawyer-specific information.
1. Affirmative Misstatements/Outright Lies
The easy case involving fraud is one in which a lawyer tells an
outright lie. For example, a lawyer commits fraud by stating that he is
an experienced criminal defense lawyer when in fact he has never
handled any criminal cases. Lawyers may not lie about their experience
and academic credentials, and courts have found them liable for fraud in
such circumstances. 113
2. Potentially Misleading Statements
A slightly more complicated situation occurs when a lawyer makes
potentially misleading statements, although those statements may not
constitute outright lies. For example, if a lawyer with solid civil
litigation experience but no criminal experience tries to retain a
prospective criminal client by saying: “I have extensive experience and
am sure that I can do an excellent job for you,” but does not tell the
prospective client that he has no criminal experience, the attorney has
not told the client an outright lie, but the statement is potentially
misleading. A lawyer is unlikely to face liability for fraud based on this
particular kind of “half-truth,” particularly given the protection that
courts traditionally give to statements of opinion.
Ct. App. 2004) (“A fraud claim against a lawyer is no different than a fraud claim against anyone else.”).
111. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 529.
112. Although fraud generally requires an intentional, knowing, or reckless misstatement,
attorneys and other professionals have also been held liable for making negligent misrepresentations.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (emphasis added) (“One who, in the course of his
business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.” (emphasis added)); see also Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at
564–68.
113. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 423–24 (2d Cir. 2000) (Lawyer claimed experience that he
did not have.); Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691 (D.N.J. 1994) (Lawyer claimed
academic credentials that he did not have.).
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Courts have, on occasion, imposed liability for half-truths. Although
an individual is generally safe saying nothing, once a person
“voluntarily elects to make a partial disclosure, [he] is deemed to have
assumed a duty to tell the whole truth.” 114 As the Restatement of Torts
provides: a person makes a fraudulent misrepresentation when he
“stat[es] the truth so far as it goes,” but the speaker “knows or believes”
the statement as a whole to be “materially misleading” because the
speaker has omitted “additional or qualifying matter.” 115 In one case, a
lawyer who had taken inactive status was disciplined for describing
himself as an “attorney” on a form submitted to a state agency in
connection with his campaign for public office. 116
Although half-truths can be actionable, lawyers, like other
professionals, are generally entitled to engage in “puffing”—what one
court called “a healthy self-estimation.” 117 Courts generally consider
puffing to be “a nonactionable assertion of opinion” 118 as long as the
lawyer does not make a “false or grossly misleading statement” that
demonstrates “an intent to create a false impression of expertise or
experience.” 119
In light of this high standard, the lawyer with good civil experience
but no criminal experience, who tells his prospective criminal client, “I
have extensive experience and am sure that I can do an excellent job for
you,” is unlikely to face liability. His statement that he has “extensive
experience” is somewhat deceptive, but probably not “grossly
misleading,” and, moreover, the lawyer’s extensive civil experience is
somewhat relevant to his ability to ably handle the client’s case.

114. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d 574, 584 (5th Cir. 2001).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977). See also Meade v. Cedarapids, Inc., 164
F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) (“‘[O]ne who makes a representation that is misleading because it is in
the nature of a half-truth assumes the obligation to make a full and fair disclosure of the whole truth.’”
(quoting Gregory v. Novak, 855 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Or. Ct. App. 1993))); Morales v. Morales, 98 S.W.3d
343, 347 (Tex. App. 2003) (“[W]hen one voluntarily discloses information, he has a duty to disclose the
whole truth rather than making a partial disclosure that conveys a false impression.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
116. In re Conduct of Kumley, 75 P.3d 432, 435 (Or. 2003).
117. Baker, 239 F.3d at 423.
118. Miller v. William Chevrolet/GEO, Inc., 762 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS 757 (5th ed. 1984) (“[S]ales talk, or puffing . . . is
considered to be offered and understood as an expression of the seller’s opinion only . . . on which no
reasonable man would rely.”).
119. Griffin v. Fowler, 579 S.E.2d 848, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Johnson & Lovorn, supra note
88, at 552 (“[S]tatements that extend beyond expressing a favorable opinion, and instead assert false
facts, are actionable.”). Johnson and Lovorn further note that puffing is also actionable if (1) the speaker
does not actually have confidence in the opinion he is expressing about his talents; (2) the speaker has
no factual basis for stating the view he expressed; or (3) the “facts known to the speaker are . . . wholly
inconsistent with the opinion voiced.” Id.
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Moreover, his belief that he “can do an excellent job” for the client is
probably nothing more than nonactionable puffing.
3. Silence
To state a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff generally must point to
an affirmative misstatement, 120 so a lawyer who says nothing to a
prospective client about the lawyer’s credentials or the lawyer’s prior
discipline, usually cannot be sued for fraud. 121 In other words, “silence
is golden.” 122
As Johnson and Lovorn note, however, there are three exceptions to
this basic rule, 123 though none of these exceptions apply to the typical
lawyer–prospective client relationship. First, an individual must
disclose “facts basic to the transaction” to the opposing party if he
knows that the opposing party is about to enter into the transaction
operating under a mistake as to those basic facts, and that the opposing
party, “because of the relationship between them, the customs of the
trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a
disclosure of those facts.” 124 Although this exception sounds like it
might fit the lawyer–prospective client relationship, the comments to the
Restatement make clear that this exception is narrow and applies only
when the party’s conduct is “so shocking to the ethical sense of the
community, and is so extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of
swindling, in which the plaintiff is led by appearances into a bargain that
is a trap, of whose essence and substance he is unaware.” 125 Consistent
with this standard, this exception applies to the attorney–prospective
client situation “only in the rarest of cases . . . such as where a lawyer
fails to disclose that he is presently suspended from the practice of law
[or] under indictment.” 126 Thus, under this exception, the lawyer does
not have to disclose lawyer-specific information such as prior discipline,
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
121. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 536 (“It has long been said that ‘silence is golden.’
This rule applies in the legal arena, as in other contexts. In general, there is no duty to disclose
information merely because another person would find that information useful, interesting, or
beneficial.”).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 536–37.
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977) (emphasis added); Johnson & Lovorn,
supra note 88, at 537–38.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 551 cmt. 1 (1977).
126. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 538 (collecting cases). Johnson and Lovorn also state
that this exception would apply to an attorney’s failure to disclose that he is “addicted to illegal drugs,”
but they cite to cases involving doctors not lawyers. Id. Research for this Article did not reveal any
cases in which lawyers were found liable for failing to disclose their addiction to illegal drugs.
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prior malpractice judgments, a lack of malpractice insurance, or relevant
experience.
The second exception to the general rule that “silence is golden”
occurs when a person fails to disclose material facts that are not
reasonably discoverable. 127 Normally, each party to a transaction has
the burden of acting diligently to discover all relevant facts before
entering into the transaction. 128 This makes sense as a policy matter
because otherwise there would be no incentive for parties “to actively
protect their own interests.” 129 But if the facts are not discoverable, it
would be “futile to place the burden of discovery” on the party who does
not have the information. 130
Because publicly available information about lawyers can be difficult
or even impossible to obtain, as previously discussed, 131 perhaps this
exception should apply to the attorney–prospective client relationship,
but again courts have applied this exception narrowly and have not
applied it to attorneys. 132 Furthermore, it is unlikely that courts will
apply it to the lawyer–prospective client relationship in the future. 133
Instead, courts are likely to conclude that lawyer-specific information is
reasonably discoverable “through inquiry and disclosure” for purposes
of this exception. 134 After all, at least some lawyer-specific information
is available to consumers who perform a diligent search for that
information, and, moreover, consumers can obtain other lawyer-specific
information by asking the lawyer. 135
The final exception to the “silence is golden” rule is the obligation of
a fiduciary “to disclose relevant information to a beneficiary because the
fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence imposes a duty to
speak.” 136 Although lawyers certainly owe many quasi-fiduciary duties

127. Id. at 539 (collecting cases). See also Wolf v. Burngardt, 524 P.2d 726, 734 (Kan. 1974)
(“Where one party to a contract . . . has . . . knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach
of the other party and which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . he is
under a legal obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud.” (citation omitted)).
128. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 536 n.21 (“‘Just as D is under no obligation to rescue a
stranger from peril, so too D need not disclose to P any information that might help P to make a firm
decision.’” (quoting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 553 (1999)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra Part I.
132. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 541–42 (The primary application of this exception is to
real estate transactions.).
133. See id. at 542.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 542–43.
136. Id. at 543.
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to prospective clients, 137 the attorney does not have an established
fiduciary relationship with the prospective client under current law;
therefore, this exception does not apply. 138
In short, silence is golden for attorneys. Neither the professional rules
of conduct nor the law of fraud compels them to disclose lawyer-specific
information to prospective clients.
III. THE CASE FOR IMPOSING AN AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION
ON LAWYERS
This Part presents the theoretical, moral, and public policy arguments
that justify imposing a duty on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific
information to prospective clients: (1) closing the information gap; (2)
consumer protection; (3) the moral and philosophical concept of
informed consent; (4) fulfilling prospective clients’ expectations; and (5)
improving public confidence in the legal profession.
A. Closing the Information Gap
A common justification for regulating professionals, including
lawyers, is to rectify a market failure known as information
asymmetry. 139 One commentator described the concept as it relates to
the market for professional services in the following way:
The theory of information asymmetries posits that wide information
disparities exist in professional services markets (which includes . . . legal
services) between providers and purchasers. The theory’s premise is that
professional services are highly specialized and highly skilled, and that
very little specific information about the quality of professional services
is available to the public. Because of the sophisticated and often
technical nature of these services, consumers typically lack the
knowledge needed to understand and evaluate the little information they
might have; to compare the value of services offered by competing
professionals; or to judge the quality of their work during or after services
are rendered. In contrast, professionals in the field have the expertise and
competence to make these judgments. 140

A regulation that provides consumers with information about the
professional services that they are seeking can help fill this information
137. See supra Part II.
138. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 545–46.
139. Barton, supra note 3, at 437 n.26 (2001) (collecting sources).
140. Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
1035, 1079 (2001).
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gap. 141
The current state of the legal services market fits this model. As
previously noted, 142 while regular users of legal services have access to
information about their prospective lawyers through a network of
contacts, less sophisticated users of legal services have difficulty finding
critical information about their prospective lawyers and, even if they
find it, they have difficulty evaluating that information. 143 To make
matters worse, although consumers are unable to find out negative
information about prospective lawyers, they are bombarded by positive
information about prospective lawyers through billboards, television and
radio advertisements, lawyer websites, blogs, and newsletters. 144
Regulation is therefore needed not only to fill the information gap but
to balance the marketplace. 145 The best way to address this problem is
to create a regulation that provides information to legal consumers. 146
The proposal set forth in this Article requires lawyers to provide lawyerspecific information to their prospective clients, which would help fill
this cavernous information gap.
B. Consumer Protection
Related to the theoretical justification aimed at correcting the
information asymmetry in the legal services market is the public policy
justification of protecting consumers.
Imposing an obligation on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific
141. Id. at 1080 (“Given the relative paucity of reliable information on professional services,
professional self-regulation . . . generally benefits consumers because it fills the information gap and
helps consumers select and evaluate a professional without incurring high search costs.”).
142. See supra Part I.
143. Barton, supra note 3, at 437 (noting that legal “consumers lack sufficient information to
gauge the quality” of the lawyer).
144. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
145. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 381 (“Since Bates, no significant marketplace
realignments have been developed to offer client–consumers advantages complementing those gained by
lawyers during this period. In sum, disclosure advertising would help to bring about that balance of
rights that each client–consumer requires in order to make a more economically efficient choice in the
marketplace.”).
146. See Barton, supra note 3, at 485–86 (“[L]awyer disciplinary systems should be altered to
allow the greatest possible flow of information to the public. . . . Disciplinary bodies should make all
client complaints a matter of public record. . . . Lawyers who have been disciplined should be required
to disclose the discipline to any new customers.”); DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 362 (Creating a
“more fully informed marketplace will be more economically efficient. In an increasingly informationdriven era, such a change seems consistent with cultural and marketplace forces of considerable
vitality.”). But see Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 533 (“For example, a lawyer presumably does
not have to disclose to a client a disciplinary sanction in the nature of a private reprimand. In that
situation, there has already been a judicial or quasi-judicial determination that the public interest is best
served by the reprimand being private, rather than public.”).
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information will protect consumers, particularly those who are not
regular users of legal services and are therefore unfamiliar with the legal
system. These individuals rarely consult lawyers, and, when they do, it
is typically under stressful circumstances such as a “divorce or criminal
prosecution.” 147
Moreover, regardless of how stressful their situations are, these
unsophisticated users of legal services tend to know little about lawyers
and do not know how to select an appropriate one for their case.148
Compelling disclosure of lawyer-specific information will give them
information that they may not be able to find on their own and help them
make a better decision about which lawyer to hire.
Consumer protection is particularly important given the professional
rules governing lawyer competency, which “free lawyers to compete for
all types of legal work, regardless of how experienced or qualified they
are.” 149 The comment to the lawyer competency rule 150 provides that
the lawyer “need not necessarily have special training or prior
experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is
unfamiliar” and states further that lawyers can gain the required level of
competence “through necessary study.” 151 In other words, the rules
governing lawyer competence provide that a tax lawyer can take on a
divorce case as long as the lawyer takes the time to teach himself how to
handle the divorce case. Because the rules of professional conduct do
not protect the consumer from hiring a lawyer without any relevant
experience, it would seem particularly important for the consumer to
know about a prospective lawyer’s experience in order to decide
whether to hire such a lawyer; yet, under current law, the tax lawyer has
no affirmative obligation to disclose to his prospective divorce client
that he has never handled a divorce case.
Perhaps most importantly, imposing a disclosure obligation would
help protect legal consumers from dishonest lawyers. Although the
precise rate is unknown, “the limited data suggest that the rate of
recidivism among lawyers who receive public sanctions is fairly
high.” 152 In light of the fact that a lawyer who has committed
147. Donna S. Harkness, Packaged and Sold: Subjecting Elder Law Practice to Consumer
Protection Laws, 11 J.L. & POL’Y. 525, 538 (2003) (arguing that legal practice should be subjected to
consumer protection laws). See also Berenson, supra note 1, at 648–49.
148. Harkness, supra note 147, at 538 (citing Morton, supra note 4, at 284).
149. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 569.
150. Model Rule 1.1 requires that the lawyer have the “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1
(2006).
151. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
152. Levin, supra note 12, at 3.
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misconduct in the past is more likely to commit future misconduct, legal
consumers are entitled to know whether the prospective lawyer has been
disciplined in the past so that they can protect themselves.
Imposing a disclosure obligation would have one more significant
benefit for consumers—it would serve as a significant deterrent to
lawyer misconduct. If lawyers know that they are going to have to
disclose misconduct to all prospective clients, it should cause them to be
more careful about avoiding misconduct in the first place. 153
C. Informed Consent
There is also a moral and philosophical justification for requiring
lawyers to provide prospective clients with additional information about
themselves: the concept of informed consent, which is “deeply ingrained
in American culture.” 154
Inspired by the informed consent doctrine in the medical field, legal
ethics commentators in the 1970s and 1980s began advocating for a
version of the informed consent doctrine in the law governing
lawyers. 155 The central goal of these commentators was to continue the
movement away from the traditional paradigm of the lawyer–client
relationship, in which lawyers controlled and directed the
representation, 156 to a situation where “clients, not lawyers, [would]

153. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 377 (“Such information could decisively affect the
client’s selection of an attorney or a referring counsel’s choice of an attorney. Viewed in this light,
disclosure advertising of such sanctions could potentially pose a significant threat to some of the future
business sought by the sanctioned attorney. Thus, visibility in the marketplace should enhance sanction
avoidance and act as a deterrent against inappropriate lawyer conduct.”); Levin, supra note 12, at 29
(arguing that increasing the openness of disciplinary proceedings would deter lawyer misconduct).
154. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle For Truly
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 781 (1999). This moral and philosophical
principal also underlies a lawyer’s duty to inform a current client that the lawyer has committed
malpractice during the course of the representation. Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer’s Duty to Inform
His Client of His Own Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174 (2009).
155. See, e.g., Troy E. Elder, Poor Clients, Informed Consent, and the Ethics of Rejection, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1004 (2007); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1979); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Gary A. Munneke, The Lawyer’s Duty to Keep Clients
Informed: Establishing a Standard of Care in Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391
(1989); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney–Client Relationship: The Argument for
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987).
156. Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1053 (1984) (noting that traditionally, lawyers held
“decisionmaking power far beyond that of an ordinary agent”). The first set of ethical rules—David
Hoffman’s Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment—described lawyers as “fatherly
guardians of a system laden with moral questions beyond their clients’ authority.” Id.
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make the most significant decisions in their cases.” 157 The philosophical
premises of the doctrine of informed consent—again borrowed from the
medical field—are: (1) to support clients’ individual autonomy by
giving them information concerning their rights so that they can
“effectively exercise those rights,” 158 and (2) to respect clients’ human
dignity by treating them as equals in the lawyer–client relationship. 159
The legal doctrine of informed consent has now achieved “doctrinal
status” 160 and has been enshrined in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct; the Rules now require informed consent in approximately a
dozen situations, 161 and the term “informed consent” is itself defined
along with numerous other concepts critical to the law governing
lawyers in Rule 1.0. The Rules define “informed consent” as “the
agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct.” 162
As a moral and philosophical norm, the doctrine has continued to gain
support, 163 and the duty to disclose lawyer-specific information to the
prospective client is rooted in this norm. Informing the prospective
client about the lawyer’s disciplinary history—or lack thereof—and the
lawyer’s relevant experience respects the prospective client’s
autonomous right to make the critical choice of whether to hire one
lawyer or another. 164 In addition, giving the prospective client full
information upon which to make an informed choice about which lawyer
to hire puts the prospective client on an equal footing with the lawyer
and demonstrates respect for the client’s human dignity. 165
157. Elder, supra note 155, at 1005.
158. Martyn, supra note 155, at 307.
159. Id. at 313.
160. Elder, supra note 155, at 1004. See also Maute, supra note 156, at 1052 (“[T]he regulatory
and ethical framework created by the Model Rules supports a new joint venture model for allocation of
authority between client and lawyer. Under this new model, the client is principal with presumptive
authority over the objectives of the representation, and the lawyer is principal with presumptive
authority over the means by which those objectives are pursued.”).
161. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a), 1.8(b), 1.18, 1.7(b)(4), 1.8(a)(3), 1.8(f)(1),
1.9(a)(b), 1.11(a)(2), 1.11(d)(2), 1.12(a), 1.5(c), 1.5(e) (2006); see also Eli Wald, Taking Attorney–
Client Communications (And Therefore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 760 (2008).
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2006).
163. See Elder, supra note 155, at 1003.
164. Professor Berenson made a similar argument in favor of lawyer profiles: “The consumer
sovereignty and autonomy arguments in favor of publicly accessible professional profiles are similar in
the legal context to those in the medical context. As consumers of legal services, potential clients will
better be able to find appropriate legal representation the more they know about potential providers of
such services.” Berenson, supra note 1, at 680.
165. Martyn, supra note 155, at 313.
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D. The Prospective Client’s Expectations
Another reason to impose a duty on lawyers to disclose lawyerspecific information is to meet the prospective client’s expectations.
The prospective client approaches a meeting with his prospective lawyer
much differently than he approaches a meeting with, for example, a
plumber. “Unlike the sale of cabbages, pick-up trucks, or insurance
annuities, the usual marketplace ethos does not control” the attorney–
prospective client relationship. 166 Lawyers promote themselves as
“professionals,” not “profit-maximizing businessmen,” and use the
cover of the professional code “to induce clients to use and trust”
them. 167 While people might question the qualifications of the general
contractor renovating their house or expect their auto mechanic to try to
rip them off, prospective clients see their prospective lawyers as zealous
advocates—“aggressive and relentless in pursuing each client’s goals”—
and trusted confidants even before the representation has begun. 168
This expectation is reinforced by the fact that lawyers already owe
prospective clients a wide variety of quasi-fiduciary duties as previously
discussed. 169 These duties, particularly the strict duty of confidentiality
owed to prospective clients, 170 strengthen the notion that the lawyer is
someone whom the prospective client can trust and someone who will
be forthcoming with the prospective client. Given all of this,
prospective clients likely expect that lawyers, unlike typical service
providers like plumbers, will be concerned with more than just their own
bottom line and therefore will disclose relevant information about
themselves. 171 Thus, imposing a duty on lawyers to disclose lawyerspecific information will meet consumers’ expectations.
E. Public Confidence
Finally, imposing a disclosure obligation on lawyers might help boost
the public’s lagging confidence in the legal profession, which is one of

166. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 396 n.222.
167. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 585–86.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 591.
171. But see Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 547 (“Beyond this duty of reasonable care,
courts should not blindly impose a duty of absolute and perfect candor on attorneys to relate information
about credentials or experience. A client who hires an attorney has no legitimate expectation that the
attorney will divulge every unfavorable fact relating to the attorney’s credentials or experience. Rather,
one expects an attorney to disclose what is important, to overlook what is not, and to exercise reasonable
judgment in between.”).
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the stated goals of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 172
The public’s lack of confidence in the legal profession is a
longstanding problem, 173 and, if anything, the image of lawyers is
getting worse. 174 A report from the American Bar Association’s
Litigation Section recently concluded that this lack of confidence stems
from “the profession’s poor handling of basic client relationships and
absence of attention to communication.” 175
Although creating the disclosure obligation might result in an initial
flood of information about complaints against lawyers, which could
have a negative impact on the legal profession’s image, in the long run,
the public will appreciate lawyers’ willingness to “come clean.” 176 The
self-disclosure proposed by this Article is certainly not a cure-all, but a
regime in which lawyers set themselves apart from other service
providers by imposing on themselves an affirmative duty to prospective
clients to disclose lawyer-specific information, including negative
information, might help boost the damaged image of the profession. 177
Indeed, this regime of transparency might help restore the legal
profession to its traditional leadership role. 178

172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE ¶ 6 (2006) (“[A] lawyer should further the
public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.”).
173. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 353.
174. See, e.g., Harkness, supra note 147, at 541; Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625
(1995) (upholding Florida’s thirty day ban on lawyer solicitation of accident victims as a legitimate
“effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida lawyers”); Judge Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First
Century Ethos for the Legal Profession: Why Bother?, 86 DEN. U. L. REV. 865, 866–67 (2009)
(“American society is experiencing a Cycle of Cynicism that threatens public confidence in the law and
legal institutions. If we do not find ways to reverse this Cycle of Cynicism and restore public
confidence, the cohesiveness of American society and our individual rights and freedoms will be in
jeopardy. Lawyers have the ability to combat this Cycle of Cynicism, but only if they are willing, as a
profession, to explore, articulate and adopt a common commitment to a value greater than their self
interest—to the Rule of Law.”).
175. See ABA Litigation Lawyers, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/ (last visited Sept. 27,
2010) (emphasis added).
176. Morton, supra note 4, at 292–93.
177. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 395 (“The suggestion of a new tradition espousing
disclosure advertising . . . is designed to assist the profession in stemming the crisis of confidence by
introducing true visibility to the system.”).
178. See id. at 397 (“If the bar becomes the first of our core institutions to commit itself seriously
to such disciplinary visibility, its leadership mantle may be restored. Visibility might become an
energizing principle. As such, it may aid not only in rebuilding the professional credibility of our legal
institutions, but it might also help to mold a new tradition that other actors could come to emulate in a
re-ordering and information-driven marketplace.”).
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IV. COMPARING DOCTORS AND LAWYERS
In determining an appropriate self-disclosure rule for lawyers, it
seems natural to examine the regime governing doctors. A comparison
between disclosure requirements for doctors and those presently
required of attorneys yields two important differences. First, as set forth
in subpart A, more information is publicly available about doctors than
about lawyers making it much easier for consumers to find out
physician-specific information than to find out lawyer-specific
information. Second, as set forth in subpart B, despite the general
availability of significant physician-specific information, some courts
have nevertheless found doctors liable for failing to reveal physicianspecific information to their patients. As subpart C argues, this makes
the case for the disclosure of lawyer-specific information even stronger.
A. The Wide Availability of Physician-Specific Information
It is much easier for a consumer to find an appropriate physician than
it is for a consumer to find an appropriate lawyer. 179 The main reason is
that more information is publicly available about doctors. All fifty states
now have state laws requiring doctors to create physician profiles.180
Although state requirements vary, the information in these profiles
generally includes the kind of physician-specific information that
patients seek: demographic and educational background, licenses,
certifications, malpractice suits, disciplinary history, and criminal
convictions. 181 Thus, with a simple Google search, a patient can
generally find out critical information about his prospective doctor. 182
B. Doctors’ Duty to Disclose Physician-Specific Information
In addition to disclosing physician-specific information in publicly
available physician profiles, in some situations physicians have had to
179. Berenson, supra note 1, at 648–56.
180. See Matthew E. Brown, Redefining The Physician Selection Process and Rewriting Medical
Malpractice Settlement Disclosure Webpages, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 483 (2005). For links to each
state’s physician profile webpage, see http://www.fsmb.org/directory_smb.html.
181. Berenson, supra note 1, at 657; Brown, supra note 180, at 483 n.31.
182. Moreover, doctor rating systems seem to be more widespread than lawyer rating systems.
For example, two popular rating organizations—Angie’s List and Zagat—rate doctors but not lawyers.
See Angie’s List, http://www.angieslist.com/AngiesList/Visitor/PressDetail.aspx?i=818 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2010); Milt Freudenheim, Noted Rater of Restaurants Brings Its Touch to Medicine, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at B8. At this time, the Zagat ratings are being compiled and edited by WellPoint,
an insurance company, and the reviews are only available to WellPoint’s two million BlueCross plan
members. Id.
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divulge this information directly to their patients. Although most courts
have not imposed this requirement on physicians, in the last two
decades, some courts have held that doctors must disclose this
information under the doctrine of informed consent.
In the relationship between physician and patient, the doctrine of
informed consent developed primarily as a protection for the patient
against “unpermitted medical intrusion.” 183 A patient who does not give
informed consent to a specific medical procedure should be able to
obtain damages under tort law—traditionally under a battery theory (i.e.
unwanted touching,) 184 and for negligence under modern law. 185 In
other words, the “current doctrine compels physicians to disclose
information sufficient to allow patients to make voluntary,
knowledgeable choices about their care,” 186 and if the doctor obtains
informed consent from the patient the doctor will not be liable. 187 All
fifty states recognize the informed consent doctrine. 188
Generally, a patient’s cause of action for informed consent is based on
a physician’s failure to adequately inform the patient about the risks
associated with a medical procedure, 189 but in a pair of articles in the
1990s, 190 Professors Aaron Twerski and Neil Cohen forecasted “a
183. Dayna B. Matthew, Race Religion, and Informed Consent—Lessons from Social Science, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 152 (2008); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 44–48 (1979). Justice Cardozo provided the
classic formulation of this justification: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body.” Scholoendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1975), as
recognized in Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
184. Martyn, supra note 155, at 311; Matthew, supra note 183, at 152.
185. Nolan-Haley, supra note 154, at 782 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 190 (5th ed. 1984)).
186. Matthew, supra note 183, at 152; Nolan-Haley, supra note 154, at 781 (“In those
transactions where informed consent is required, the legal doctrine requires that individuals who give
consent be competent, informed about the particular intervention, and consent voluntarily.”).
187. Matthew, supra note 183, at 152. See also Joseph H. King, The Standard of Care for
Residents and Other Medical School Graduates in Training, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 718 (2006) (“This
new kid on the block is the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine requires that a treating physician
disclose the material risks of the contemplated medical procedure to his or her patient in order that the
patient’s consent to the treatment be ‘informed.’ Failing that, liability may be imposed on a nondisclosing doctor for the material risks of the medical procedure that eventuate.”).
188. King, supra note 187, at 718 n.154.
189. See DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191, 196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (“Traditionally, our
review of this duty to inform has been confined to the actual procedure and has not included provider
specific information.”).
190. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers: A First Look at the New
Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1992) [hereinafter Twerski & Cohen, Medical
Statistics]; Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent:
Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Twerski & Cohen,
Informed Consent].
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second revolution in informed consent.” 191 Professors Twerski and
Cohen predicted that “[w]ith the advent of more extensive gathering and
comparison of data” concerning physicians, patients would soon argue
that they had the right to be informed not only of the “risks associated
with the procedures” to be performed “but also about the relative risks
associated with the medical providers who would perform these
procedures.” 192 In other words, patients who are injured in medical
procedures would argue that they would “not have agreed to undergo a
procedure with a ‘riskier’ physician had they been aware that a
physician with a better track record was available.” 193
Although “revolution” may be too strong a word to describe what has
transpired, Twerski and Cohen accurately predicted a significant
increase in lawsuits alleging that physicians violated a duty to their
patients by failing to disclose risks peculiar to the physician. Plaintiffs
have brought claims that fall into three categories: (1) situations in
which the physician allegedly suffered from a physical or mental
impairment; (2) cases in which the physician allegedly had a conflicting
financial or research interest; and (3) cases in which patients claimed
that they lacked adequate information about the physician’s level of
experience. 194 Although courts have rejected a majority of these
lawsuits, enough have succeeded that Twerski and Cohen’s predicted
“revolution” may still come about.
1. Physical or Mental Impairments
Some patients have alleged that the physician should have to disclose
a physical or mental condition that might affect the physician’s ability to
treat patients or pose a particular threat to the patient. 195 Courts that
191. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190 (emphasis added).
192. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190, at 3; Twerski & Cohen, Medical
Statistics, supra note 190, at 28–29 (“[D]oes a provider have a duty to disclose information that
identifies the provider as an independent risk factor? The answer, we believe, is yes. This information
relates directly to the results likely to flow from a decision to have this provider perform this procedure.
It is not difficult to conclude that a reasonable doctor should provide this potentially outcome
determinative information to the patient and that a reasonable patient would want this information as
part of the decision-making process.”). See also Jennifer Wolfberg, Two Kinds of Statistics, the Kind
You Look Up and the Kind You Make Up: A Critical Analysis of Comparative Provider Statistics and
the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 585, 585 (2002) (“[I]t is just a matter of time before
the rest of the country eventually follows suit with Wisconsin and broadens the doctrine of informed
consent to include provisions of provider statistics.”).
193. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190, at 5.
194. See King, supra note 187, at 720–24.
195. Id. at 720 (collecting cases). Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You Experienced?
The Relevance of Disclosure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 373, 396–400 (2002).
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have considered such cases have come to widely different conclusions.
For instance, in Faya v. Almaraz, 196 the Maryland Supreme Court found
that the jury should have been able to consider whether the physician’s
failure to disclose that he was HIV-positive was a breach of the
physician’s duty to obtain informed consent. 197 Similarly, in Hidding v.
Williams, 198 the Louisiana Court of Appeals found that a physician had
breached his duty to his patient by failing to disclose his history of
alcohol abuse. 199
But several courts have rejected similar claims. For example, in
Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 200 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the physician had no duty to disclose his prior cocaine
usage. 201 The court was concerned about the slippery slope that a
contrary holding would create because it would be impossible to define
“which of a professional’s life factors would be subject to such a
disclosure requirement.” 202 Similarly, a Pennsylvania appellate court
held that a doctor had no duty to disclose that he suffered from
alcoholism. 203
2. Conflicts of Interest
Like lawyers and other professionals, health care providers often face
“a set of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a
primary interest . . . tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary

196. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
197. Id. at 339. See also Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1278–83
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); Doe v. Noe, 690 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (imposing an
absolute duty on physicians to disclose HIV status when seeking a patient’s consent to perform an
invasive medical procedure which exposes the patient to the risk of HIV transmission). Michelle
Wilcox Debarge, Note, The Performance of Invasive Procedures by HIV-Infected Doctors: The Duty To
Disclose Under The Informed Consent Doctrine, 25 CONN. L. REV. 991, 992–93 (1993) (collecting cases
and arguing that courts should require HIV-positive doctors to disclose their status whenever they
perform “surgical or invasive procedures”).
198. 578 So. 2d. 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
199. Id. at 1197. See also Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 35
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that the surgeon’s failure to disclose that he suffered from a
condition called Raynaud’s Syndrome that affected the use of his hands was relevant to patient’s
informed consent claim).
200. 528 S.E. 2d 777 (Ga. 2000).
201. Id. at 782.
202. Id. See also Prince v. Esposito, 628 S.E. 2d. 601, 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a
chiropractor had no duty to disclose a prior battery allegation to his patients).
203. Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 216–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[M]atters such as personal
weaknesses and professional credentials of those who provide health care are the responsibility of the
hospitals employing them, the professional corporations who offer their services, or the associations
which are charged with oversight.”).
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interest.” 204 In other words, in some situations, doctors’ primary
responsibility—patient care—can be compromised by financial or
research interests. Such potential conflicts arise in a number of different
contexts. 205 For example, in the context of managed health care:
The most fundamental source of conflicts of interest for the physician
is the use of financial incentives in physician compensation schemes to
reduce costs. Whereas the traditional fee-for-service system encouraged
physicians to over-utilize medical services, thereby increasing health care
costs, the modern compensation system provides incentives to physicians
in various ways to under-utilize medical services, thereby decreasing
health care costs, with a resulting increase in the HMOs’ bottom line. 206

Should physicians have to reveal that they are subject to potentially
conflicting financial or research interests? Again, courts are split,
though the majority position is that doctors do not have to disclose such
interests.
The seminal case holding that physicians have a duty to disclose such
interests is Moore v. Regents of the University of California. 207 In
Moore, the patient sought treatment for his hairy-cell leukemia at UCLA
Medical Center, and his doctors recommended removing his spleen. 208
Without informing the patient, his doctors also made arrangements to
conduct research on the patient’s spleen to develop valuable commercial
products. 209 After the surgery, the patient was asked to return repeatedly
for follow-up care, during which his doctors took blood, bone, skin,
204. Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.
573, 576 (1993).
205. See Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: The Challenge of
Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327 (2003) (addressing conflicts of interest
raised when health care providers engage in human subjects research); Margaret Z. Johns, Informed
Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 967, 1012 (2007) (arguing that physicians should have to “disclose off-label prescriptions and
conflicts of interest resulting from drug-company marketing”); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P.
Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing,
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491 (2009) (discussing conflicts of interest created by the marketing efforts of
pharmaceutical companies); George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to
Legal Services and What We Can Learn From the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate Paradigm,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 826–28 (2001) (discussing the financial incentives created by managed care
contracts).
206. Harris & Foran, supra note 205, at 819. See also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
AMA, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 331 (1995), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ ceja_13a94.pdf (“[M]anaged care can place the needs of patients in
conflict with the financial interests of their physicians. Managed care plans use bonuses and fee
withholds to make physicians cost conscious. As a result, when physicians are deciding whether to
order a test, they will recognize that it may have an adverse impact on their income.”).
207. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
208. Id. at 480–81.
209. Id. at 481.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/9

36

Cooper: ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE
COOPER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED)

2010]

ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE

3/18/2011 1:12:40 PM

733

marrow, and sperm samples from him that were used to develop a
valuable patented cell line without any disclosure to the patient of the
doctors’ financial interests. 210 The California Supreme Court concluded
that Moore’s doctors had an obligation to disclose their financial and
research interests to him: “[A] reasonable patient would want to know
whether the physician ha[d] an economic interest that might affect the
physician’s professional judgment.” 211 In other words, although the
doctor might have delivered the exact same treatment regardless of his
financial interests, “the possibility that an interest extraneous to the
patient’s health has affected the physician’s judgment is something that
a reasonable patient would want to know in deciding whether to consent
to a proposed course of treatment.” 212
Several courts have followed Moore, holding that a health care
provider has a duty to disclose potentially conflicting financial or
research interests. For example, in D.A.B. v. Brown, 213 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that physicians who had prescribed a synthetic
growth hormone drug were obligated, under the auspices of informed
consent theory, to disclose that the drug distributor made payments to
the physician to induce him to prescribe the hormone: “The doctor’s
duty to disclose the kickback scheme presents a classic informed consent
issue.” 214
Despite an increasing number of conflicting personal and financial
interests, most courts have rejected Moore, particularly where the claim
is that the doctor failed to disclose his financial arrangement with an
HMO. 215
210. Id.
211. Id. at 483.
212. Id. at 484.
213. 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
214. Id. at 171. See also Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 69 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[A] doctor who
proposes an experimental course of treatment must not only tell the patient about the treatment and its
consequences but must also inform the patient that he is conducting an experimental treatment and that
the patient is part of a study.”).
215. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 504–05 (Ill. 2000) (concluding that a physician does not
have a duty to disclose financial incentives to withhold necessary medical treatment that arise out of the
physician’s contract with the patient’s managed care organization); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s
Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1070–71 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting claim that
physician had duty to disclose researcher’s financial interests). See also Harris & Foran, supra note 205,
at 827 (“[C]ourts have been reluctant . . . to apply [the informed consent] doctrine to require disclosure
of financial incentives in managed care contracts.”); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information:
Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1750 (1999) (“With respect to
informed consent, managed care has raised new questions about the extent to which physicians’ existing
disclosure responsibilities should be modified to reflect the changed economic environment of clinical
practice and the resultant threat to the integrity of agency relationships. Specifically, courts must
determine whether the scope of required disclosure should extend beyond the physical risks of treatment
to other matters that shape patients’ access to treatment, course of care, and clinical outcomes.
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3. Lack of Experience
The third type of claim asserted by patients—and the claim that
Twerski and Cohen were most focused on in their prediction of a
“revolution” 216 —is that physicians have a duty to disclose to their
patients their level of experience and training. Several courts, beginning
with the landmark Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Johnson by Adler v.
Kokemoor, 217 now recognize such a claim, though most courts continue
to reject this theory of liability.
In Johnson, the plaintiff–patient, who suffered from an aneurysm,
alleged that his surgeon did not provide sufficient information about his
experience with the particular type of challenging surgery involved. 218
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the patient was entitled to
know about the defendant’s lack of experience with this surgery, the
difficulty of the proposed surgery, and the fact that different physicians
have “substantially different success rates” with the same medical
procedures. 219 Following Johnson, a Wisconsin appellate court held that
a doctor must disclose: “1. The extent of his experience in performing
the type of operation; 2. A comparison of the morbidity and mortality
statistics for the type of surgery with other physicians; and 3. Referral to
a tertiary care center staffed by more experienced physicians.” 220
Outside of Wisconsin, a few courts have chosen to follow Johnson
and have held that a physician has a duty to disclose information about
his experience and training in at least some circumstances. 221 In a
slightly different context, the Connecticut Court of Appeals concluded
that:
Candidates for disclosure include information about physicians’ individual biases, skills, expertise, and
incentives, as well as external constraints on their ability to pursue their patients’ medical interests. For
example, informed consent law is beginning to consider the relevance to patients of physician
compensation arrangements and other financial interests. To date, most courts have resisted requiring
so-called ‘physician-specific’ disclosure.”).
216. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190, at 1.
217. 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
218. Id. at 507.
219. Id. at 507–08.
220. Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., No. 02-1729, 2003 WL 22998133, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 2003).
221. See Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Del. 1997) (holding that the trial court erred
in excluding expert testimony about defendant–physician’s “failure to inform his patient of his lack of
recent aneurysm surgery”); Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 165–66 (Md. 2000) (given the “expanding
era of more complex medical procedures, group practices, and collaborative efforts among health care
providers . . . the identity of the persons who will be performing aspects of the surgery” and “who,
precisely, will be conducting or superintending the procedure or therapy” must be discussed and
resolved, “at least if raised by the patient”); see also King, supra note 187, at 722 n.169 (collecting and
analyzing cases).
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the duty to inform encompasses provider specific information where the
facts and circumstances of the particular situation suggest that such
information would be found material by a reasonable patient in making
the decision to embark on a particular course of treatment, regardless of
whether the patient has sought to elicit the information from the
provider. 222

In that case, a dentist had failed to inform his new patient, who was
injured during the procedure, that he “was understaffed, was using
equipment with which she was unfamiliar and was using an office that
was not ready for business.” 223
The rationale of Johnson and its progeny—the more experienced the
doctor, the better the medical case—makes sense and is supported by
empirical data. 224 Thus, “[a]ny contention that a reasonable patient
would consider his or her physician’s level of experience immaterial to a
procedure, particularly an invasive procedure, is clearly contradicted by
real life experiences.” 225
But Johnson and its progeny have been criticized for, among other
things, imposing a potentially unworkable regime on physicians. As one
commentator has written: “Would the Johnson holding mean that
virtually any surgeon within ninety miles of the Mayo Clinic must
essentially apprise his patients of the option of going to the Mayo
Clinic? In other words, where is the stopping point once we start down
that informed consent road?” 226
In part recognizing this criticism, several courts have rejected
Johnson-like claims. For example, in Whiteside v. Lukson, 227 the
defendant–surgeon failed to disclose to the patient that, although he had
trained for the particular surgery by performing it on pigs, he had never
222. DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191, 196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
223. Id. at 197.
224. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190, at 13 n.30. See also Brad M.
Rostolsky, Comment, Practice Makes Perfect: Experience-Related Information Should Fall Within The
Purview of Pennsylvania’s Doctrine of Informed Consent, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 543 (2002) (arguing that
Pennsylvania should follow Wisconsin).
225. Iheukwumere, supra note 195, at 413–14. A recent incident at a Veterans Administration
hospital in Philadelphia drives home the danger to patients when a physician—even a well-credentialed
one—lacks experience in performing a particular medical procedure. In that case, the doctor, who has a
medical degree from Johns Hopkins and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, had only limited
experience with a relatively routine procedure called brachytherapy in which radioactive seeds are
supposed to be implanted into the prostate to treat prostate cancer. In multiple instances, the doctor
allegedly botched the procedure by implanting them in the patients’ healthy bladder rather than the
prostate. See Walt Bogdanich, At V.A. Hospital, a Rogue Cancer Unit, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at
A1.
226. King, supra note 187, at 724. But see Twerski & Cohen, Medical Statistics, supra note 190,
at 27–28 (disputing the slippery slope argument).
227. 947 P.2d 1263. (Wash. 1997).
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done the procedure on a human. 228 Even though the physician botched
the procedure, the court held that “a surgeon’s lack of experience in
performing a particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for the
purposes of . . . informed consent.” 229 Several other courts have reached
similar conclusions. 230
C. What Lawyers Can Learn from the Experience of Doctors
Why are doctors’ disclosure obligations relevant to lawyers? First,
there is no reason why it should be easier for a consumer to find out
information about a prospective doctor than about a prospective lawyer.
To be sure, there are differences between doctors and lawyers. For
example, it is easier to objectively determine a doctor’s success rate
through statistics like survival rates than it is to determine a lawyer’s
track record. When the defense lawyer settled his client’s case for
$100,000, was that a “success?” Such a settlement is perhaps a success
if a trial would have yielded a $200,000 judgment against the client, but
we can never know this for sure.
But from the consumer’s standpoint, the similarities between doctors
and lawyers are greater than the differences. Doctors deal directly with
their patients’ health, but lawyers are often asked to help patients with
equally critical issues involving their clients’ life, liberty, and property.
Moreover, just like the attorney–client relationship, the doctor–patient
relationship is perceived differently than the typical relationship between
buyer and seller. “Unlike the sale of cabbages, pick-up trucks, or
insurance annuities, the usual marketplace ethos does not control” a
consumer’s relationship with his lawyer or his doctor. 231 In medicine, as
in law, patients do not know what questions to ask their doctors, and

228. Id. at 1264.
229. Id. at 1265.
230. See Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (Physician was not
required to inform patient of more experienced surgeon or a different hospital.); Duttry v. Patterson, 771
A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (“[E]vidence of a physician’s personal characteristics and experience is
irrelevant to an informed consent claim[.]”); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958 (Haw. 1997)
(declining “to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the
lack thereof to a patient”); Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d 162, 167 (1990) (No affirmative duty for health
care provider to discuss his experience with patient); Abram v. Children’s Hosp. of Buffalo, 542
N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (rejecting argument that informed consent required disclosure
of qualifications of staff participating in plaintiff’s surgery); Thomas v. Wilfac, Inc., 828 P.2d 597, 601
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Informed consent “requires disclosure of material facts relating to treatment, not
disclosure of a physician’s qualifications.”); see also Barry R. Furrow, Doctors’ Dirty Little Secrets: The
Dark Side of Medical Privacy, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 289–90 (1998) (stating that the law has
consistently avoided a rule of informed consent that requires disclosure of physician risk).
231. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 396 n.222.
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society does not expect them to know. 232 As one court stated: “We
discard the thought that the patient should ask for information before the
physician is required to disclose. Caveat emptor is not the norm for the
consumer of medical services.” 233 This is also true with respect to
lawyers and questions about legal services. Given these similarities,
there is no reason that consumers of legal services should not have the
same information available to them as consumers of medical services.
“If information about experience and success rate is material to selecting
a doctor, then it is also at least arguably relevant to selecting an
attorney.” 234
If anything, legal consumers need even more information about their
prospective lawyers than medical consumers need about their doctors.
Doctors are encouraged to specialize, and receive special training and
certification in their field. Although a consumer probably will not know
whether a doctor has experience with a particular procedure, he will at
least know that if he has a heart problem he should see a cardiologist,
and he can be confident that the cardiologist has significant expertise in
treating heart problems.
By contrast, the professional regulation of lawyers encourages
generalization, not specialization.
As noted earlier, the lawyer
competency rules provide that a lawyer “need not necessarily have
special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type
with which the lawyer is unfamiliar.” 235 As a result, “lawyers often are
willing to perform a spectrum of services without specialized training
even when true specialists in the field exist.” 236 To make matters worse,
the organized bar has made it nearly impossible for consumers to
identify appropriate specialists. In most jurisdictions, lawyers cannot
claim specialization unless they obtain very specific accreditation. 237 In
some states, the opposite problem exists—those states either do not
regulate claims of specialization at all or they impose insufficiently
rigorous training on lawyers who want to claim specialization. 238 This
is just as problematic for the consumer because he cannot rely on a
lawyer’s specialization claim. This makes it even more difficult for a
consumer to hire an appropriate lawyer, and as a result, the legal
232. King, supra note 187, at 740 (citations omitted).
233. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
234. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 574.
235. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2006).
236. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 583.
237. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2006) (limiting claims of specialization
to lawyers who have obtained very specific accreditation); see also Zacharias, supra note 3, at 583, 583
n.32.
238. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 584–85.
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consumer is more likely than the medical consumer to hire a
Imposing an
professional who lacks the appropriate expertise.
obligation on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information would
help solve this problem.
The other lesson that lawyers can learn from the experience of doctors
is that, despite the fact that consumers can learn more about their
prospective doctors than about their prospective lawyers, there is a
growing trend of patients suing doctors for their failure to disclose
physician-specific information. Although the majority of courts have
ruled against patients who have brought these claims, the decisions that
have come out in favor of patients are a cautionary tale for lawyers.
While this Article does not predict a “revolution” in legal malpractice
claims, it is certainly possible that creative plaintiffs’ lawyers will make
these kinds of claims in the near future. Lawyers can avoid any
potential liability simply by disclosing lawyer-specific information.
V. PROPOSAL FOR DISCLOSING LAWYER-SPECIFIC INFORMATION
Having demonstrated the need for self-disclosure of lawyer-specific
information, the next issue is what form that disclosure should take.
This Part proposes an amendment to the rules of professional conduct
that would require lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information to
prospective clients, describes the content of the proposed disclosure, and
anticipates some of the potential criticisms of the self-disclosure
requirement.
A. An Amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.18, which sets forth the
lawyers’ duties to Prospective Clients, should be amended to impose a
duty on lawyers to communicate with prospective clients that is similar
to the duty to communicate with current clients. 239 The amendment,
modeled on Rule 1.4 about communication with current clients, should
read: “A lawyer shall disclose lawyer-specific information to the
prospective client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
prospective client to make an informed decision regarding whether to
form an attorney–client relationship with the lawyer.” This language
echoes current Rule 1.4(b), which requires a lawyer to “explain a
matter” to a current client “to the extent reasonably necessary to permit

239. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006).
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the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation,” 240
and therefore should be familiar to lawyers.
This language should not stand on its own, however; rather, the rules
should more specifically define the lawyer’s self-disclosure duty.
Adding more detail to the regulation will help ensure that it delivers its
intended consumer protection and will also let lawyers know what they
can do to make sure that they are complying with the regulation. In
order to clarify the lawyer’s new duty, the amendment to Rule 1.18
should define the “lawyer-specific information” that must be disclosed
as “specific information about the lawyer that a reasonable person would
find material to his or her selection of a lawyer.” 241 Moreover, the
comments to the amended Rule 1.18 should provide that the lawyer will
generally satisfy his duty to communicate “lawyer-specific information”
by disclosing the following categories of information to the prospective
client: (1) Biographical, Licensing and Certification Information; (2)
Relevant Experience and Expertise, including an explanation of why the
lawyer’s prior experience is relevant to the prospective client’s case; (3)
Disciplinary History; (4) Information Regarding Malpractice Insurance;
and (5) Malpractice Payments.
While the definition of “lawyer-specific information” and the
accompanying comment will provide important guidance for lawyers
and prospective clients, the overall regulation is flexible enough to
account for unforeseen situations that call for disclosure of information
yet do not fall within these specific categories.
The rules should not require lawyers to make these self-disclosures in
any particular form, but instead allow lawyers to make the disclosures in
whatever way they feel most comfortable. Lawyers might decide that
the best way to make the disclosures is to incorporate them into their
sales pitch and, in that way, provide appropriate context. For instance,
they can preface any negative information that they have to disclose by
informing consumers that these disclosures are required by the rules of
professional conduct. Moreover, lawyers can provide truthful and
appropriate disclaimers along with their disclosures: they can provide
clients with additional information, such as, “I have not handled any
cases just like that, but I do not know if you will find anybody in town
who has and I have a lot of trial experience;” “It was a one-time mistake
that will not happen again;” “I only settled that malpractice case because
my insurance company wanted to.” Thus, the lawyer can integrate any
negative information from required disclosures into all of the positive
240. See id. R. 1.4(b).
241. This definition should be included in Model Rule 1.0, which defines the terminology used in
the rules.
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information typically used to attract clients.
B. Categories of Mandatory Disclosure
1. Biographical, Licensing and Certification Information 242
Lawyers should inform prospective clients of the colleges and law
schools that they attended, the dates of graduation, and the degrees that
they received. 243 In addition, lawyers should disclose where they are
admitted to practice law, the dates of admission, and any specialty
certifications. 244 Even though all of this information is generally
available elsewhere, it would be better for the consumer to have it all in
one place. Furthermore, it is easy for the lawyer to provide, and the
requirement that lawyers provide this information should prove
“relatively unobjectionable.” 245
2. Relevant Experience and Expertise
As previously discussed, 246 consumers, specifically unsophisticated
users of legal services, need specific information about a prospective
lawyer’s experience and “expertise in matters like the client’s matter” 247
so that the consumer can make an informed choice about whether to hire
the lawyer. 248 A simple list of the lawyer’s relevant past matters is a
starting point, but it is insufficient because consumers who are
unfamiliar with the legal system might have difficulty understanding the
relevance of the lawyer’s past experience to their case. Therefore, the
lawyer must also carefully explain why the lawyer’s experience is
relevant and why his experience makes him a suitable or unsuitable
choice for this matter. 249 It may seem odd to impose this burden on the
242. See Berenson, supra note 1, at 683 (recommending that this information be included in the
lawyer’s profile).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See supra Part I.
247. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 592–93.
248. For more sophisticated consumers, such as large corporations and wealthy individuals, the
disclosure need not be as extensive because they have a better understanding of the relative merits of
hiring the lawyer, and moreover, they know what questions to ask to find out what they want to know
about the lawyer. See id. at 605 (“If lawyers have obligations to provide information at the retainer
stage that parallel their obligations toward existing clients, the codes arguably envision that lawyers will
tailor their advice to the sophistication and needs of each prospective client.”).
249. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2006) (defining “informed consent” to mean
“the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
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prospective lawyer, particularly if it requires the lawyer to give the
consumer information that might cause the consumer not to hire the
lawyer, but it is critical. Unless the consumer hires another lawyer to
help him choose a lawyer, the only person in a position to help a
prospective client determine whether a prospective lawyer is suitable for
the client’s particular case is the prospective lawyer himself. 250
How will this work? It is not enough for the lawyer to tell the client
simply that he is a litigator or even that he is a plaintiff’s side litigator or
even that he is a plaintiff’s side medical malpractice litigator. Rather,
the lawyer needs to disclose exactly what kind of experience and
expertise he has and how that is relevant to the prospective client’s case.
Significantly, this disclosure does not need to be a death knell for the
lawyer’s chances of winning the business. Indeed, in many cases, the
lawyer’s relevant experience and expertise will be a selling point. Even
in the event that the lawyer has never handled a case exactly like the
prospective client’s case, that does not mean that the lawyer cannot or
should not handle the prospective client’s case 251 or that the lawyer
cannot successfully earn the prospective client’s business.
For example, assume the prospective client comes to the lawyer’s
office for a consultation on a claim that her baby died during delivery as
a result of the obstetrician’s malpractice. Assume further that the lawyer
has never handled a case with those allegations but has successfully
handled a number of medical malpractice claims involving allegations of
botched plastic surgery. Under a self-disclosure regime, the lawyer must
disclose that he has not handled a case involving alleged malpractice
during delivery, but the lawyer can explain how his own experience is
relevant and beneficial. The lawyer can explain that all medical
malpractice claims are similar in some respects, that he is well-versed in
the state’s medical malpractice law, that he has vast trial experience, that
he has had great success both at trial and with obtaining pre-trial
settlements, and that he has had success suing this particular hospital. In
other words, nothing in this proposal prevents the lawyer from making
the same pitch he normally would to the prospective client. The pitch
just needs to include appropriate disclaimers. 252
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the
proposed course of conduct”).
250. See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 587–88 (“Unless one can assume that prospective clients are
fully capable of negotiating for their representation or that they can understand the need for independent
advice before signing retainers, the prospective lawyers seem to be in the sole position to guide the
clients.”).
251. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2006).
252. There are limits on what the attorney has to disclose. For instance, the attorney’s disclosure
need not go so far as to inform the prospective client that there is a cheaper alternative, see Posting of
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3. Disciplinary History
In deciding whether to hire a lawyer, consumers place great
importance on whether the lawyer has ever been disciplined. 253
Consumers use this information to help them decide whether a
prospective lawyer is honest and trustworthy. Given the importance of
this information to consumers and their inability to discovery it on their
own, attorneys should be required to disclose all public disciplinary
actions taken against them. 254
In addition to public disciplinary actions, almost all jurisdictions
impose private discipline as a form of punishment, and “in many
jurisdictions, it is the type of discipline most often imposed.” 255 There
is no principled basis for not requiring lawyers to disclose any private
disciplinary action taken against them. In cases of private discipline, “a
lawyer has been found to have engaged in misconduct, but his reputation
is protected on the theory that the lawyer is not someone from whom the
public needs protection.” 256 As Professor Levin points out, “there is no
evidence . . . that disciplinary counsel or hearing boards—which
typically impose private sanctions—are capable of determining whether
the lawyer is likely to engage in similar misconduct in the future.” 257 To
the contrary, there is some evidence that lawyers who committed
misconduct in the past are more likely to commit misconduct in the
future. 258 Accordingly, the lawyer should have to disclose private
discipline because the interest of the consumer outweighs the lawyer’s
interest in privacy. 259

Andrew Perlman to Legal Ethics Blog, www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2009/03/an-ethical-obligationto-tell-your-client-about-a-cheaper-alternative.html#comments (Mar. 5, 2009, 09:59 PM) (concluding
that lawyer probably does not have a duty to disclose to his client the existence of a cheaper option,
whether that option is a lower biller inside the firm or a cheaper lawyer outside the firm) or to offer the
name of another lawyer who could handle the case. See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 580 (“Imposing
upon lawyers a referral obligation would require them to conduct an inquiry into the market that they
otherwise might never undertake.”). One California case held that an attorney had a duty to refer the
client to a specialist, but there the attorney–client relationship had already been established and the
referral was necessary in order for the lawyer, who lacked expertise in tax matters, to meet his duty of
care. See Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (Ca. Ct. App. 1979).
253. Morton, supra note 4, at 287–88; DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 376–77.
254. Berenson, supra note 1, at 685.
255. Levin, supra note 12, at 20.
256. Id. at 24.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 29.
259. Again, the lawyer’s disclosure of prior discipline does not need to ruin his chances of
winning the client’s business. In making the disclosure, the lawyer can include appropriate
explanations—I was young; it was a one-time problem; I used to be an alcoholic, etc.
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4. Information Regarding Malpractice Insurance
As previously discussed, 260 consumers naturally want to know
“whether or not the attorney who they are considering retaining carries
malpractice insurance,” 261 so that the consumer will be able to recover if
his lawyer commits malpractice. Despite the ABA’s recognition of this
issue’s importance—via its model rule on the subject 262 —most states
currently do not require lawyers to disclose this information. 263 If
plumbers advertise that they are “insured and bonded”—presumably
because customers want to know this information before they hire them
in case something goes wrong—surely legal consumers are entitled to
know the same information about their lawyer.
5. Malpractice Payments
Just as consumers want to know whether a prospective lawyer has
ever been disciplined because it may make that lawyer more likely to
engage in misconduct in the future, consumers also want to know if a
prospective lawyer has ever made a malpractice payment because that
might indicate that the lawyer is more likely to commit malpractice in
the future. 264 Professor Berenson wisely suggests that disclosure of
malpractice payments be limited to those above a “nuisance value” of
$5,000. 265 To be sure, malpractice payments are not necessarily proof
of anything—in some cases the lawyer decides to settle because it is
easier and less expensive than fighting—but the lawyer is entitled to
provide the appropriate context to the consumer when he makes the
disclosure. For example, if appropriate, the lawyer can explain that the
lawyer’s practice involves “cases that generate [a high] proportion of
malpractice claims.” 266
C. Anticipating the Critics
Imposing a requirement on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific
information is not a perfect solution. It is also not likely to be a popular
idea among lawyers, who will resist a rule that requires them to reveal

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra Part I.C.2.
Berenson, supra note 1, at 684–85.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.1.
Berenson, supra note 1, at 684.
Id.
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negative information about themselves. 267 But will it really hurt
lawyers?
As an initial matter, the context in which this information will be
disclosed is important. The proposed rule would allow a lawyer to make
the required disclosures in whatever way he wants. If, for example, the
lawyer discloses a limited amount of negative information in the context
of a sales pitch in which the lawyer is touting his many positive
qualities, it is hard to see how the lawyer will be particularly damaged.
Further, a self-disclosure regime might hurt lawyers who have
damaging information to reveal, but a regime of self-disclosure will
actually help those attorneys who have no negative information to
reveal. They can even tout this by telling prospective clients, for
example: “the rules of professional conduct require lawyers to reveal
whether they have ever been disciplined, and I am proud to tell you that
I have never had a single complaint filed against me.”
A self-disclosure regime will hurt lawyers who try to take on cases
that they are not equipped to handle because they will be compelled to
disclose their lack of relevant experience and expertise. But again, to
the extent that self-disclosure drives consumers to lawyers with more
relevant experience and expertise, this is a reason to praise the rule, not
condemn it. 268
Certainly, at the beginning of a self-disclosure regime, the legal
profession’s reputation as a whole might take a hit as the market is
flooded with negative information about lawyers that was previously
kept private. But, in the long run, a self-disclosure regime might
actually have a positive economic benefit for lawyers and the legal
profession: “Even the most cynical, business-driven lawyer . . . should
recognize that restoring consumer confidence in our legal institutions
also has positive long-term business benefits.” 269
Another likely criticism is that this issue should be left to the free
market. In other words, some will argue that the burden should be on
the consumer to investigate prospective lawyers and discover this

267. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 362 (“A move toward requiring greater visibility of
lawyer discipline or trial court sanctions would be controversial, however, because it might be seen as a
threatening departure from the status quo.”). Id. at 380 (“The long history of invisible discipline
suggests that attorneys, as business-generating professionals, resist the publication of negative
information.”).
268. One relevant concern is that a self-disclosure regime will have a disproportionately negative
effect on junior lawyers who are trying to get a foothold in a competitive market. Junior lawyers can,
however, tout other desirable qualities: “I will work harder;” “I will be more communicative;” “My rates
are lower;” etc. Moreover, to the extent that a self-disclosure regime moves the legal profession even a
little bit toward the kind of apprenticeships we see in the medical profession, it may be beneficial.
269. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 397.
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information themselves. After all, there are a number of helpful guides
produced by bar associations and consumer protection groups, 270 and at
least some information is publicly available on the Internet and through
other means. Perhaps most importantly, the client can simply ask the
prospective lawyer for information, and the lawyer must provide truthful
answers. 271 There are several strong counter-arguments. This Article
already addressed the shortcomings of consumer guides. Even if
consumers find them and follow them, they do not provide the kind of
information necessary for consumers to make an informed decision
because not all of the necessary information is publicly available. 272
Moreover, relying on consumers to ask questions is a heavy burden
for consumers to bear for a variety of reasons. First, consumers,
particularly unsophisticated consumers, may not know what questions to
ask. Second, “the usual marketplace ethos does not control” the
attorney–prospective client relationship. 273
Lawyers promote
themselves as “professionals,” not “profit-maximizing businessmen,”
and use the cover of the professional code “to induce clients to use and
trust” them. 274 While people might question the qualifications of the
general contractor renovating their house or expect their auto mechanic
to try to rip them off, prospective clients see their prospective lawyers as
zealous advocates—“aggressive and relentless in pursuing each client’s
goals”—and trusted confidants even before the representation has
begun. 275 Indeed, “only the most sophisticated and experienced clients,
such as corporations represented by in-house counsel, are likely to
undertake [the] form of investigation” 276 that would yield the lawyerspecific information that prospective clients need to make an informed
choice about the selection of a lawyer. Third, in the absence of
regulation, lawyers have no incentive to provide this information to
prospective clients and might not be completely forthcoming even when
asked direct questions. 277
Thus, although lawyers must answer
prospective clients’ questions truthfully, they do not necessarily have to
answer them fully. Without a disclosure requirement, the lawyer might
answer questions truthfully but not provide the full information that the
270. See supra Part I.
271. See supra Part II.B.
272. See supra Part I.
273. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 396 n.222.
274. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 585–86.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 595.
277. Id. at 577 (“A consulted lawyer often will have personal incentives not to address a
prospective client’s lack of information because the client’s focus on the information may cause her to
seek representation elsewhere or not to seek legal representation at all.”).
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client needs to make an informed decision. 278
Another argument that will be raised against this proposal is that it
constitutes a violation of lawyers’ privacy. 279 While some of the
required disclosures proposed in this Article might prove embarrassing
to lawyers, it is difficult to see how the disclosures compromise their
privacy. First, much of the information is already publicly available
(albeit difficult for consumers to find). For example, most state bars will
disclose disciplinary information to those who ask. 280 Likewise,
malpractice judgments are public records accessible to those who know
where to look. 281 Similarly, state bars are increasingly requiring lawyers
to provide them (but not prospective clients) with information regarding
their malpractice insurance. 282 Moreover, because the information that
lawyers would disclose relates to their professional lives as opposed to
their personal lives, it is difficult to see how they have a significant
expectation of privacy. That expectation of privacy is reduced to the
extent that the information is already public. In short, because much of
this information is publicly available already and lawyers have little or
no expectation of privacy in the information, any “marginal reduction in
lawyer privacy that would result . . . is greatly outweighed by the benefit
that would be provided to consumers.” 283
CONCLUSION
This Article attempted to describe and ameliorate a longstanding and
vexing problem: the inability of consumers to learn critical information
about prospective lawyers.
This lawyer-specific information is
surprisingly difficult to find even with a diligent search, and lawyers
have no obligation under current law to reveal this information to
consumers. This scarcity of information makes it difficult for
consumers to find an appropriate lawyer to handle their case.
This Article proposed a novel approach to solving this problem. The
rules of professional conduct should be amended to require a lawyer to
disclose sufficient “lawyer-specific information” to enable prospective
clients to make an informed decision about which lawyer to hire. At a
minimum, this disclosure should include: (1) basic biographical,

278. See Brigid McMenamin, 10 Things Your Lawyer Won’t Tell You, SMART MONEY, Sept. 18,
2003, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/10-things-your-lawyer-wont-tell-you-14764/.
279. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 560–61 (arguing for privacy rights).
280. See supra Part I.B.
281. See supra Part I.C.1.
282. See supra Part I.C.2.
283. Berenson, supra note 1, at 682.
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licensing and certification information; (2) disciplinary history; (3)
information about the lawyer’s malpractice insurance; (4) malpractice
payments; and (5) the lawyer’s specific experience and expertise
relevant to this matter as well as an explanation of the relationship
between the lawyer’s prior experience and the work that will be
necessary in the proposed new matter.
Several arguments support this proposed amendment. First, lawyers
already owe prospective clients a variety of quasi-fiduciary duties.
Indeed, the only significant duty that they do not owe prospective clients
is the duty to communicate, which is arguably the most important duty.
Imposing this duty on lawyers would be consistent with the quasifiduciary nature of the lawyer–prospective client relationship.
Second, this Article identified five theoretical, moral, and public
policy justifications supporting this proposed amendment.
This
requirement would help solve the problem of information asymmetry
that plagues the market for legal services. Additionally, a self-disclosure
requirement would provide important protection for consumers.
Disclosing lawyer-specific information to the prospective clients so that
they can make an informed decision is also consistent with the moral
and philosophical notion of informed consent, which serves the twin
goals of supporting clients’ individual autonomy by giving them
information concerning their rights so that they can “effectively exercise
those rights” and respecting clients’ human dignity by treating them as
equals in the lawyer–client relationship. Further, an affirmative
disclosure requirement is consistent with what consumers expect from
prospective lawyers. Finally, this self-disclosure requirement would
improve public confidence in the legal profession.
A comparison with doctors and their disclosure obligations provides a
further argument in favor of requiring lawyers to disclose lawyerspecific information. There is no reason that it should be easier for
consumers to find information about prospective doctors than
prospective lawyers. Moreover, by voluntarily disclosing lawyerspecific information, lawyers can avoid the kinds of claims that doctors
are now facing for failing to disclose physician-specific information.
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